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ARTICLES 
THE FOLKLORE OF INFORMATIONALISM:   
THE CASE OF SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH 
Oren Bracha* 
 
Are search engine results protected speech under the First Amendment?  
This has become an essential question in the debate over search engine 
regulation.  Search engine speech is at the cutting edge of several recent 
trends in First Amendment jurisprudence:  the challenge of protection for 
machine-generated speech, a recent tendency toward constraining 
governmental economic regulatory power through aggressive and broad 
interpretation of freedom of speech, and the question of limitations on the 
coverage of the First Amendment.  Arguments on behalf of First 
Amendment protection for search engine results focus on different protected 
speech interests.  Free speech scrutiny is justified and necessary when it 
defends the speech interests of indexed content providers or users.  But 
search engine speech proponents have gone further, arguing that search 
engines are protected either as editors or speakers themselves.  These 
arguments are doctrinally uncertain and normatively baseless.  Despite 
some possible support in recent U.S. Supreme Court decisions, the theory of 
First Amendment coverage on which these arguments rely is not firmly 
grounded in doctrine and its potentially far-reaching implications have not 
been considered.  As a normative matter, the broad arguments for search 
engine speech stand on dubious foundations.  A proper examination of the 
social practices of search engine speech reveals that none of the established 
normative theories of freedom of speech provide clear support for including 
such expression within the scope of the First Amendment.  This normative 
conclusion can be accommodated and First Amendment protection to 
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INTRODUCTION 
Last night, Google spoke to me.  I asked about the best French 
restaurants in my neighborhood, and it expressed its opinions on the 
subject.  We spent half the night arguing.  If you find the preceding lines 
strange then you have not been following the debate over search engine 
speech.  The problem of search engine speech is at the forefront of the 
broader debate over machine speech.1  Is the expressive content generated 
by computerized machines—the maps that appear on the screen of a GPS 
navigational aid, your social network’s recommendations of new friends, or 
the list of synonyms proposed by my word processor—speech protected 
under the First Amendment?  This question is, in turn, a subset of a larger 
set of vexing challenges created by the impending technological reality of 
pervasive semiautonomous automated agents.2  We have electronic 
artificial agents who contract in our name, partially (soon to be fully) 
automated drones that kill for us, and computer platforms that speak to us.  
Can these semiautonomous agents be contained by the existing categories 
 
 1. See Tim Wu, Free Speech for Computers?, N.Y. TIMES, June 20, 2012, at A29. 
 2. See generally SAMIR CHOPRA & LAURENCE F. WHITE, A LEGAL THEORY FOR 
AUTONOMOUS ARTIFICIAL AGENTS (2011). 
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of the relevant laws, or should those categories and laws change in order to 
adequately accommodate them?  Can we easily trace the lines linking the 
actions of these automated machines to the people who created and 
programmed them, thereby simply connecting the actions to the array of 
legal rights and duties of such human agents?  Not since the last time a 
radically new social phenomenon in the form of “corporate persons” 
challenged existing legal categories was the law faced with such demanding 
conceptual and normative tasks.3  This Article tackles in detail one limited 
(but complex enough) facet of the challenge of automated agents, that of 
search engine speech. 
The origins of the search engine speech debate are much more prosaic 
than the deep philosophical and conceptual questions alluded to above.  
General purpose internet search engines constitute big business.4  The 
economic, social, and cultural importance of these vital information 
gatekeepers, together with the dominance of one firm (Google), have 
provoked demands for scrutiny and legal restrictions on the activities of 
search engines.5  Complaints of search engine manipulation, bias, or abuse 
and proposals for remedying them take many forms, but all share a common 
element:  a claim for restricting in some way the search engine’s absolute 
discretion over ranking and presenting search results to users.6  The First 
Amendment has emerged as a doomsday defensive weapon in this struggle. 
It proved to be such an effective weapon because it is one of the most 
formidable barriers for government regulation in contemporary 
constitutional law.7  From the perspective of those seeking to avoid 
regulation, if only search engine results could be plausibly presented as 
protectable speech, absolute discretion over them would be considerably 
shielded from any legal constraint.  And this is exactly what has happened 
in the last decade. Arguments that search engine results are speech 
protected under the First Amendment were first tested, with great success, 
in the early court cases involving attempts to limit Google’s complete 
discretion over its search practices through a variety of common law and 
statutory doctrines.8  Since then, the argument has been perfected and it has 
 
 3. For a description of how corporate personhood challenged existing legal categories, 
see generally MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE TRANSFORMATION OF AMERICAN LAW 1870–1960:  
THE CRISIS OF LEGAL ORTHODOXY 65–107 (1992), and Gregory A. Mark, The 
Personification of the Business Corporation in American Law, 54 U. CHI. L. REV. 1441 
(1987). 
 4. See, e.g., JOHN BATTELLE, THE SEARCH:  HOW GOOGLE AND ITS RIVALS REWROTE 
THE RULES OF BUSINESS AND TRANSFORMED OUR CULTURE 123 (2005) (describing how 
Google’s value rose from nothing to $3 billion in five years); Jennifer Slegg, Search 
Revenues Hit $8.7 Billion in First Half of 2013, SEARCH ENGINE WATCH (Oct. 15 2013), 
http://searchenginewatch.com/article/2300829/Search-Revenues-Hit-8.7-Billion-in-First-
Half-of-2013. 
 5. See infra text accompanying notes 43–56. 
 6. See infra text accompanying notes 47–52. 
 7. See infra text accompanying note 166. 
 8. See Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 630 (D. Del. 2007); 
Kinderstart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at *13 (N.D. 
Cal. Mar. 16, 2007); Datner v. Yahoo, No. BC 355217, slip op. at 2 (Cal. Super. Ct. Dec. 12, 
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emerged as Google’s first line of defense on all of the fronts in which the 
search engine regulation battle is joined.9 
This Article brackets the policy question of whether search engine 
regulations are desirable or feasible.  It focuses instead on what started as a 
sideshow but is gradually turning into the main event:  the question of 
search engine speech.  The general proposition that search engines’ ranking 
of their results is protected under the First Amendment represents several, 
very different, arguments whose applications lead to different results.  The 
most plausible variant of the argument is that the First Amendment protects 
against the government’s use of search engines as censorial tools.10  Search 
engines are vital intermediaries for internet information.11  As such, 
governments could use them to restrict both expression of, and access to, 
disfavored viewpoints.12  From this perspective, the protected speech 
interest is that of speakers and users rather than that of the search engine 
itself.  The First Amendment has a vital role to play in protecting the speech 
rights of users against censorial regulations seeking to utilize the control 
power of search engines. 
The focus on the speech interest of users, however, leaves much room for 
regulations of search ranking not aimed at suppressing users’ speech.  This 
is why most proponents of search engine speech have turned to different 
theories.  These alternative theories present the search engine itself as the 
bearer of the protected speech rights.  In one version of the argument, 
search engines are portrayed as editors of content, the equivalent of 
newspapers, who enjoy the shield extended by the First Amendment to the 
editorial discretion of such actors.13  In an even more ambitious variant, 
search engines are seen as the speakers whose protected speech consists of 
opinions on the relative relevance of websites displayed in search results.14  
These theories, already adopted by several courts adjudicating cases of 
alleged manipulation of search engine results,15 provide a much stronger 
constitutional protection to the search engine’s control over its results.  But 
are they sound? 
At first blush, it appears that straightforward application of First 
Amendment doctrine validates both the editor and direct-speaker theory of 
search engine speech.  But there are strong doctrinal arguments to the 
contrary.  At a minimum, a careful application of existing doctrine produces 
inconclusive results. 
There is more at stake here, however, than hasty application of doctrine 
to the specific case of search engine ranking.  If accepted, the broad 
 
2006); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 
27193, at *12 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003). 
 9. See infra text accompanying notes 51–53. 
 10. See infra text accompanying notes 62–79. 
 11. See James Grimmelmann, The Structure of Search Engine Law, 93 IOWA L. REV. 1, 
3 (2007). 
 12. See James Grimmelmann, Speech Engines, 98 MINN. L. REV. 868, 901 (2014). 
 13. See infra text accompanying notes 80–90. 
 14. See infra text accompanying notes 110–17. 
 15. See cases cited supra note 8. 
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arguments for search engine speech rights and, especially, the version 
recasting search results as opinions protected under the First Amendment, 
involve potential implications that go well beyond the context of internet 
search.  The search-engines-as-speakers argument relies on an extremely 
broad theory of First Amendment coverage.  According to this theory any 
communication that satisfies a capacious technical definition of speech 
merits First Amendment protection—subject only to a narrow list of 
categories of excluded speech.16  If taken seriously, this weak threshold 
principle opens the floodgates to an enormous stream of First Amendment 
claims.  This is doubly true in the age of information and machine speech 
when a multitude of economic and social activities may fit the formal 
definition of speech.  Such a result could hamper governmental ability to 
regulate in vast areas.17  Under the basic structure of post–New Deal 
constitutional law, only a relatively small subset of regulation is subject to a 
high level of constitutional scrutiny of the kind required by the First 
Amendment.18  The search-engine-as-speakers argument, however,  has the 
potential to upend that structure.19 
One may respond that subjecting a large share of government’s 
regulatory power to an exacting standard of constitutional scrutiny is, 
though perhaps unfortunate, nonetheless an unavoidable outcome of the 
meeting between existing First Amendment doctrine and new technological 
realities.  This response misses the fact that the coverage of the First 
Amendment has never been as broad as assumed by the search engine 
speech argument.20  The difficulty with coverage limitations is the obscure 
nature of doctrine in this area and, especially, the absence of anything 
resembling a clear criterion.  Courts have traditionally relied on tacit 
consensus and classificatory maneuvers to limit the coverage of the First 
Amendment without developing clear guidance on how to draw the line.21  
The strong claims for search engine speech rights upset any tacit consensus 
in this area and force the question of coverage to the open. 
Following Robert Post, I argue that the best way to answer the question 
of First Amendment coverage is through a normative analysis of the 
specific social practices in which a particular speech is embedded.22 
Understood within its specific social context—namely, the relevant social 
practices of speakers and listeners—search engine speech is hard to justify 
on the basis of any of the traditional theories of freedom of speech.23  To 
 
 16. See Stuart Benjamin, Algorithms and Speech, 161 U. PA. L. REV. 1458–61 (2013). 
 17. See infra text accompanying notes 155–63. 
 18. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938). 
 19. See infra text accompanying notes 164–69. 
 20. See Fredrick Schauer, The Boundaries of the First Amendment:  A Preliminary 
Exploration of Constitutional Salience, 117 HARV. L. REV. 1765, 1768 (2004) (“[T]he 
speech with which the First Amendment deals is the exception and the speech that may 
routinely be regulated is the rule.”). 
 21. See infra text accompanying notes 152–54. 
 22. Robert Post, Recuperating First Amendment Doctrine, 47 STAN. L. REV. 1249 
(1995). 
 23. See infra text accompanying notes 183–96. 
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date, nobody has offered a plausible account of how the social practices of 
search engine speech are relevant to any set of values possibly underlying 
the First Amendment. 
Courts are unlikely, however, to apply direct normative analysis on a 
case-by-case basis.  They may need more concrete guidelines for deciding 
coverage questions in cases involving machine speech and speech in a 
functional context more generally.  As recently suggested by Professor Tim 
Wu, such guidance could be found in a functionality doctrine.24  Under this 
doctrine, functional speech is not protected by the First Amendment.  The 
rudimentary basis of such a doctrine already exists in the case law.25  To 
meet the challenges of machine speech, however, the doctrine must be 
further developed and clarified.  A well-defined functionality doctrine must 
require an examination of the social practices associated with speech 
allegedly restricted by a specific regulation.  Under such a rule, the First 
Amendment will not cover any speech practice that is primarily 
preoccupied with functional activities or purposes and that is not more than 
trivially connected to the realization of any free speech values (for example, 
commanding a machine to execute computer code).  This means that such a 
speech practice will trigger no First Amendment scrutiny, even if speech in 
the technical sense (i.e., the communication of a message potentially 
understandable by a recipient) is restricted and even if such restriction is 
based on the content of the speech.26 
When examined under the functionality doctrine elaborated here, search 
engine rankings are clearly functional.  Their purpose is, overwhelmingly, 
to help or channel users trying to find specific content; there is no real 
dialogue between user and search engine.27  Search engine speech, while 
communicative, is much like an interactive and complex series of 
conventional road signs whose content is limited to that necessary for the 
function of guiding travelers in particular directions.  Speech of this type is 
exactly the kind to which First Amendment protection would be denied 
altogether under a well-defined functionality doctrine. 
Courts must not blindly extend First Amendment protection to search 
engine speech while refusing to examine either the social practices within 
which this speech is embedded or the relevance of underlying values.  Such 
blind insistence on First Amendment protection is the information age 
analog to what Thurman Arnold long ago called “the folklore of 
capitalism”:  the uncritical transfer of concepts and beliefs taken from one 
socioeconomic context to a thoroughly different one.28  Arnold attacked the 
“folklorist” assumption that an economy dominated by business 
corporations constituting tremendous concentration of power and wealth 
was the same as Adam Smith’s free market composed of individual actors, 
an assumption embodied in the legitimacy-conferring myth of the corporate 
 
 24. Tim Wu, Machine Speech, 161 U. PENN. L. REV. 1495, 1496–97 (2013). 
 25. See infra text accompanying notes 226–49. 
 26. See infra text accompanying notes 250–51. 
 27. See infra text accompanying notes 259–63. 
 28. THURMAN ARNOLD, THE FOLKLORE OF CAPITALISM (1937). 
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person.29  The claim on behalf of search engine speech is part of a folklore 
of informationalism.  It is based on the uncritical assumption that simply 
because communication generated by machines as part of functional 
processes meets a technical, broad definition of speech, it is the same as 
other social practices involving speech and thus it normatively merits the 
same constitutional protection.  The result is the legitimacy-conferring myth 
of the speaking search engine.  Perhaps unsurprisingly, another 
commonality of the folklore of capitalism and the folklore of 
informationalism is that both were wielded as a shield against government 
regulation of big business.  To avoid the pitfalls of the folklore of 
informationalism, the phenomenon of search engine speech must be 
understood in its social context and then normatively evaluated. 
Part I of this Article briefly explains the origins of the search engine 
speech debate and describes the types of regulations relevant for First 
Amendment claims in this area.  It discusses each of the three concrete free 
speech arguments hidden in the general claim for First Amendment 
protection for search results:  protection of the speech interests of users and 
content providers instrumentally affected by the operation of search 
engines, protection of the speech interest of search engines as editors of 
content provided by others, and protection of the speech interest of search 
engines as direct speakers.  Part II focuses on the third, most ambitious 
variant of the argument, which treats the search engine as a direct speaker.  
Under this argument, search results are speech that embodies opinions of 
relevance protected under the First Amendment.  Part II also discusses the 
inconclusive result of existing legal doctrine as applied to this claim, 
develops a normative framework for analyzing First Amendment coverage 
questions, and applies this framework to our case.  Part II concludes that no 
plausible normative justification exists for extending First Amendment 
protection to the speech embodied in search results.  Part III asks how 
courts can apply this conclusion.  It discusses the possible development of 
an explicit functionality doctrine in First Amendment jurisprudence and 
explains how this doctrine should be applied to search results. 
I.  SEARCH ENGINE SPEECH 
Evaluating the claims that search engine results constitute speech 
protected under the First Amendment requires a clear understanding of two 
elements often left ambiguous by such claims.  First, we need a precise 
understanding of the regulation at issue—of what exactly is potentially 
regulated and how.  Second, we need an accurate definition of the speech 
interest allegedly negatively affected by the regulation.  After a brief 
introduction to the way search engines work, this Part takes up each of 
these two questions. 
 
 29. See id. at 185–206.  
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A.  Search Engine Fundamentals 
Search engines are a crucial part of the internet’s infrastructure.  Their 
basic function is to help users locate and access information relevant for the 
users’ preferences or needs.30  The exact details of search engines’ services 
change dynamically, but their basic method of operation has remained 
largely stable.  Search engines direct users to information through a three-
step process. 
First, search engines scour or “crawl” particular sources of information to 
ascertain the information in those sources, including metainformation about 
the relations between the sources.31  The core sources of information 
covered by search engines are webpages.  In principle, however, search 
engines can cover any source of information that exists in a form amenable 
to digital searches.  The information sources covered by search engines 
have been expanding in recent years with the proliferation of source-
specific search services such as Google’s books or patents search.32 
Second, search engines index the information sources they cover.  In this 
stage, the information gathered from the sources is analyzed using a 
complex algorithm.33  The algorithm is the “secret sauce” of the search 
engine.  It is the most important element that gives search its value and 
differentiates one service from another.34  The algorithm analyzes the 
information sources and their relationships according to a complex array of 
parameters.35  The result of this process is a search index that contains 
information about the relevance and importance of covered sources in 
regard to particular search terms.36 
Third, search engines allow users to run specific searches.  This is 
typically done through a textual search query submitted by the user, 
containing one or more search terms.  The search engine analyzes the 
search query by reference to its index and produces a list of results.37  The 
search engine typically presents these results as a list of text items ranked in 
descending order of relevance.  In general web searches, each result item is 
hyperlinked to the actual webpage listed.  Historically, search engine results 
were uniform in the sense that an identical search query would produce the 
same results, independent of the user’s identity or other contextual 
information about the search.38  The trend today is toward growing 
 
 30. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6 (“[A] search engine is a service that helps its 
users locate content on the Internet.”). 
 31. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 877. 
 32. Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6 (“[S]earch engines help users find more than just 
web pages.”). 
 33. Id. at 9. 
 34. See DAVID A. VISE & MARK MALSEED, THE GOOGLE STORY 45–57 (2005); Frederic 
Filloux, Google News:  The Secret Sauce, GUARDIAN (Feb. 25, 2013), 
http://www.guardian.co.uk/technology/2013/feb/25/1. 
 35. Steven Levy, Inside The Box, WIRED, Mar. 2010, at 96, available at 
http://www.wired.com/magazine/2010/02/ff_google_algorithm/. 
 36. Id. 
 37. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 877. 
 38. Zhongming Ma et al., Interest-Based Personalized Search, 25 ACM TRANS. ON 
INFO. SYS., Feb. 2007, at 1, 2, available at http://www.csupomona.edu/~zma/research/
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personalization of search results.39  Personalized search results are tailored 
to the specific interests and characteristics of the user.  This means that an 
identical search query may produce different results depending on various 
contextual factors.  Personalizing search results is based on profiling or 
modeling the user on the basis of various kinds of information, such as 
personal information directly supplied by users and analysis of past search 
and web usage patterns.40 
Search engines are, thus, important information intermediaries.41  Their 
main value resides in their effective ability to connect between two groups:  
users who want to access information and information providers.42  Both 
the demand for search engine regulation and the exact meaning of opposing 
free speech arguments are based on search engines’ status as information 
intermediaries.  By locating relevant information, search engines perform 
an invaluable function that greatly enhances the value of the internet for 
both users and information providers. 
The status of search engines as information intermediaries, however, also 
creates the risk of abuse.  Controlling the bottlenecks of internet 
information flows bestows incredible power on search engines.  This power 
creates, in turn, the risk of abuse,43 especially given the natural tendency 
toward concentration of the search market and the inherent limitations of 
effective market discipline in this field.44  The result has been a litany of 
complaints by critics against alleged abusive search engine practices 
 
Interest-Based%20Personalized%20Search.pdf (describing one-size-fits-all searches in 
which an “identical query from different users or in different contexts will generate the same 
set of results displayed in the same way for all users”). 
 39. See id.; James Pitkow et al., Personalized Search, 45 COMM. ACM, Sept. 2002, at 
50, 50, available at http://www.cond.org/p50-pitkow.pdf (describing a shift in search from 
“consensus relevancy” toward “personal relevancy”). 
 40. See Pitkow, supra note 39, at 51 (discussing techniques for personalizing search and 
dividing them into two groups:  “contextualization and individualization” (emphasis added)). 
 41. NIVA ELKIN-KOREN & ELI M. SALZBERGER, LAW, ECONOMICS AND CYBERSPACE:  
THE EFFECTS OF CYBERSPACE ON THE ECONOMIC ANALYSIS OF LAW 71 (2004) (“Search 
engines are becoming the new virtual gatekeepers of Cyberspace.”). 
 42. See Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 7 (observing that a search engine can match 
users with appropriate content providers, to the benefit of both). 
 43. See James Grimmelmann, Some Skepticism About Search Neutrality, in THE NEXT 
DIGITAL DECADE:  ESSAYS ON THE FUTURE OF THE INTERNET 435, 436 (Berin Szoka & Adam 
Marcus eds., 2010) (observing that search engine critics aim to keep search engines “from 
abusing their dominant position,” but “[t]he hard part comes in defining ‘abuse’”); see also 
Nicholas P. Dickerson, What Makes the Internet So Special?  And Why, Where, How, and by 
Whom Should Its Content Be Regulated?, 46 HOUS. L. REV. 61, 90 (2009) (“The policies of 
Google . . . represent a glaring example of corporate abuse of regulatory power.”); Frank 
Pasquale, Beyond Innovation and Competition:  The Need for Qualified Transparency in 
Internet Intermediaries, 104 NW. U. L. REV. 105, 108 (2010) (“A troubling asymmetry has 
developed:  as dominant intermediaries gather more information about users, users have less 
sense of exactly how life online is being ordered by the carriers and search engines they rely 
on.”). 
 44. On the limitation of market forces in disciplining search engine behavior, see Oren 
Bracha & Frank Pasquale, Federal Search Commission?  Access, Fairness, and 
Accountability in the Law of Search, 93 CORNELL L. REV. 1149, 1179–86 (2008); 
Grimmelmann, supra note 43, at 440. 
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prejudicial to the interest of either users or information providers.45  These 
complaints have led to demands for search engine regulation,46 and, in turn, 
to the First Amendment counterargument.  The exact nature of this free 
speech argument depends on competing understandings of the relevant 
speech and the relevant protected speech interest.  The speech and the 
protected speech interest may be attributed to each of the actors in the 
tripartite relationship created by search engines:  users, information 
providers, and the intermediary—the search engine itself.  In what follows, 
I explain the exact nature of the use of the First Amendment as a shield 
against regulation of search results and the various versions of the argument 
as a function of the alternative understandings of the speech and speech 
interest involved. 
B.  What Regulation? 
Whether and how the First Amendment applies to a particular regulation 
depends on the characteristics of the regulation.  Proponents of search 
engine speech have cast their net widely, challenging the constitutionality 
of a broad array of regulations.  Arguments for First Amendment protection 
for search results first appeared in cases where disgruntled website 
operators, adversely affected by allegedly illegitimate manipulation of 
search results, tried to impose legal liability on Google.47  These plaintiffs 
relied on an assortment of business torts and civil causes of action.  In 
response, Google argued that imposing liability under any of these causes 
of action on the basis of the search engine algorithm’s rankings would 
abridge the search engine’s speech rights, and several courts agreed.48  
These rulings imply that the First Amendment prohibits imposing liability 
based on search ranking, irrespective of the exact details of the relevant 
private law causes of action and their application in specific cases.  More 
recently, prodded by complaints from Google’s competitors about unfair 
practices in regard to its search results, the Federal Trade Commission 
(FTC) launched an investigation of Google’s search practices.49  The FTC 
 
 45. See, e.g., Viva R. Moffat, Regulating Search, 22 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 475, 487–90 
(2009) (discussing claims of negative effects of search engine power leading to calls for 
regulation); Pasquale, supra note 43, at 110–24 (discussing the various dangers of new 
“unaccountable intermediaries” including search engines). 
 46. Moffat, supra note 45, at 489 (“Concerns over [the detrimental effects of search 
engine power] have prompted the call for centralized regulation.”). 
 47. See supra note 8. 
 48. See Kinderstart.com v. Google, Inc., No. C 06-2057 JF (RS), 2007 WL 831806, at 
*21 (N.D. Cal. Mar. 16, 2007) (confronting Google’s argument for immunity under the First 
Amendment in response to a wide range of causes of actions asserted against its search 
ranking practices); Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. 
Dist. LEXIS 27193, at *10–13 (W.D. Okla. May 27, 2003) (rejecting a claim for tortious 
interference with contractual relations because Google’s ranking of a website in its results 
constituted opinions protected under the First Amendment and therefore could not be 
considered wrongful). 
 49. See In re Google Inc., FTC File No. 111-0163 (Concurring and Dissenting Statement 
of Commissioner J. Thomas Rosch Regarding Google’s Search Practices Jan. 3, 2012), 
http://www.ftc.gov/sites/default/files/documents/public_statements/concurring-and-
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terminated the investigation with no significant results.50  One major 
defense line deployed by Google’s defenders, however, was that any 
interference with the search engine’s discretion over its search results would 
violate the First Amendment.51  Finally, in light of this trend, various 
reform proposals suggesting statutory or administrative mechanisms for 
regulating or at least monitoring search ranking practices have had to 
contend with First Amendment objections.52 
As a result of these developments, the First Amendment has emerged as a 
doomsday defensive weapon deployed to counter any attempt to “regulate” 
search results prior to examining the regulations’ merits or applying 
relevant doctrines.  Bolstered by its early success, the generic speech 
argument can now be applied to virtually any format of “regulation” of 
search results and is beginning to spread to analogous realms.53  The key 
feature common to all the various regulatory measures now under the 
shadow of the First Amendment is restrictions on the search engine’s 
absolute power to identify and rank search results.  Whether the restriction 
is the result of tort liability backed by civil remedies, administrative action 
backed by administrative enforcement powers, or a proposed specific 
regulatory regime, the logic of the argument is the same:  any coercive 
interference with search results abridges speech and is thus prohibited by 
the First Amendment. 
This Article is not concerned with the policy desirability of any specific 
measure aimed at constraining search engines’ absolute discretion over their 
search results or with the optimal way for implementing such measures.  A 
particular statutory scheme or the application of various common law 
causes of action to the practices of search ranking may be an undesirable or 
unworkable policy.  Even if this is the case, however, whether the First 
Amendment generates a constitutional prohibition that blocks the 
implementation of any such measure—as many seem to think—remains a 
distinct and open question.  The analysis here focuses on this threshold 
question, which has crucial implications for the ability of government to 





 50. See id. at 1. 
 51. See EUGENE VOLOKH & DONALD M. FALK, FIRST AMENDMENT PROTECTION FOR 
SEARCH ENGINE SEARCH RESULTS (2012), available at http://www.volokh.com/wp-
content/uploads/2012/05/SearchEngineFirstAmendment.pdf. 
 52. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1188–1201; Jennifer A. Chandler, A Right 
to Reach an Audience:  An Approach to Intermediary Bias on the Internet, 35 HOFSTRA L. 
REV. 1095, 1124–29 (2007). 
 53. See Rosenberg v. Harwood, No. 100916536, 2011 WL 3153314 (D. Utah May 27, 
2011).  Google had argued that a negligence claim based on Google Maps’ faulty directions 
is barred by the First Amendment and by the Utah Constitution’s protection for freedom of 
speech.  The court avoided the constitutional question and decided the case on principles of 
tort law. Id. 
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C.  What Speech? 
The First Amendment argument rejects, then, any restriction of the 
search engine’s absolute discretion over its results as a prohibited 
abridgment of speech.  What, however, is the relevant speech being 
abridged?  As explained in detail below, proponents of search engine 
speech have relied on different answers to this question and occasionally 
offered only opaque or ambiguous responses to it.  There are three possible 
speech interests related to search engine results.  Taking each of these 
speech interests as the focus of the First Amendment produces three very 
different versions of the free speech argument.  Each of those arguments 
leads, in turn, to very different conclusions about the permissibility of 
search engine regulation. 
1.  Search Engine Constituencies’ Speech 
The first speech interest implicated by search results is both the most 
plausible and the most important.  Yet, for reasons to be explained 
momentarily, this speech interest is ignored by most, especially by those 
who would use the First Amendment as an absolute shield for search 
engines’ control over their result ranking.  This is the speech interest of 
content providers, who depend on search engines for having their voice 
heard, and end users, who rely on the search engine to find and access 
information. 
It is a commonplace observation that the internet and digital technology 
have opened up and democratized opportunities for speech.  Famously, the 
U.S. Supreme Court has commented that any person with an internet 
connection “can become a town crier with a voice that resonates farther 
than it could from any soapbox.”54  But the realization of this potential 
requires much more than broad access to the digital means of speaking.  
Without an effective way for speakers to reach an audience and for users to 
locate information, the voice of most digital town criers is likely to remain 
confined to the empty space of their virtual soapbox.  Search engines form a 
crucial element of the internet infrastructure that makes information 
effectively reachable.  While users can reach internet content in other ways, 
search engine exposure is the lifeblood of many who offer information 
through the internet.55  For large swaths of speech, the size of the audience 
depends—dramatically—on the existence and nature of search engine 
exposure.  As an early influential commentary put it:  on the internet, “to 
exist is to be indexed by a search engine.”56 
The user’s perspective is a mirror image of that of the information 
provider.  Just as search engines are crucial for allowing information 
providers to attract users, they are also indispensable to users in locating 
 
 54. Reno v. ACLU, 521 U.S. 844, 870 (1997). 
 55. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1164–65; Chandler, supra note 52, at 
1107–08. 
 56. Lucas D. Introna & Helen Nissenbaum, Shaping the Web:  Why the Politics of 
Search Engines Matters, 16 INFO. SOC’Y 169, 171 (2000). 
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information relevant to their interests and needs.  Professor James 
Grimmelmann has recently described search engines as “advisors.”57  
Search engines help users navigate their way through the information flood 
of the digital age and find the information that is most relevant for their 
preferences.58  Search engines are particularly effective and powerful tools 
for this job.  They perform their task through (potentially iterative) 
interaction with the user and in a way that is highly tailored to the 
characteristics and input of each individual.59  As “listeners,” users have a 
protected speech interest in unhindered access to others’ speech.60  The 
speech interest of users in the functionality of search results, however, goes 
beyond that of mere passive listeners or consumers of information.  
Depending on their specific architecture, many internet venues enable 
commenting, user-provided posts, and other forms of multidirectional 
speech, and thereby blur the line between listeners and speakers.61  Users 
may interact with internet content or react to it “elsewhere,” on or off the 
internet, as in the case of publishing a post on one’s own blog criticizing an 
op-ed published in an internet news venue.  But in many cases, users may 
produce speech that is even more closely entangled with the speech to 
which they gained access.  This may happen in myriad ways, such as 
reacting to blog posts, posting comments to news reports, or taking part in a 
decentralized peer-production project.  Every user is a potential—and often 
actual—speaker vis-à-vis information made accessible by search engines. 
Search engines are, thus, vital speech-facilitating tools for both 
information providers and users.  As a result, they occupy a powerful 
information gatekeeper position—a power that is dangerously susceptible to 
abuse, both by private parties and the government.  Focusing on the latter, 
search engines’ gatekeeping position is already widely used by many 
 
 57. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 874. 
 58. See Grimmelmann, supra note 11, at 6; see also Chandler, supra note 52, at 1108.  It 
is important to remember that, because of their role as critical information intermediaries, 
search engines not only serve the preferences of users but also inevitably shape them. See 
ELKIN-KOREN & SALZBERGER, supra note 41, at 72 (“By defining which information 
becomes available for each query, search engines may shape preferences, positions, beliefs 
and ideas.”); Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177–78 (analyzing search engines’ 
shaping of users’ preferences in terms of autonomy). 
 59. Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 894 (“[O]ut of all the ways that speakers and 
listeners can find each other, search is the single most listener-directed.”). 
 60. See Bd. of Educ. v. Pico, 457 U.S. 853, 867 (1982) (“[T]he Constitution protects the 
right to receive information and ideas.” (quoting Stanley v. Georgia, 394 U.S. 557, 564 
(1969))); King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 638 (7th Cir. 2005) (observing that 
freedom of speech “is also freedom to read”); Conant v. Walters, 309 F.3d 629, 643 (9th Cir. 
2002) (“It is well established that the right to hear—the right to receive information—is no 
less protected by the First Amendment than the right to speak.”). 
 61. Yochai Benkler, From Consumers to Users:  Shifting the Deeper Structures of 
Regulation Towards Sustainable Commons and User Access, 52 FED. COMM. L.J. 561, 564 
(2000) (describing how the internet communication model potentially blurs the line between 
information producers and consumers); Timothy Wu, Application-Centered Internet 
Analysis, 85 VA. L. REV. 1163, 1181 (1999) (explaining that assumptions about the effect of 
the internet on decentralization of speech power must be sensitive to the specific 
technological architecture involved). 
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governments as a censorial tool.62  Some internet speech can be extremely 
difficult to regulate,63 but by targeting the intermediary function of search 
engines, governments can control its dissemination and access.  China is the 
most conspicuous example,64 but there are many other countries that order 
search engines to filter various websites from the results available within 
their territory on different grounds.65 
The prospects of similar censorial limitations on search engines in the 
United States are not as remote as one may assume.  The driving forces 
behind this trend are intellectual property infringement and restrictions on 
“indecent” materials.  Around the turn of the century, the difficulties 
associated with controlling information flows over a global decentralized 
network led to a trend of limiting access to information by regulating 
gatekeepers.66  Internet service providers (ISPs) were the first targets.  For 
example, several state laws, mostly struck down as unconstitutional, 
allowed state authorities to order ISPs to block access to websites 
containing materials defined as “harmful to minors.”67  More recently, 
search engines, along with other intermediaries, appeared on the radar of 
regulators as potential regulative tools for preventing intellectual property 
infringement.  For example, consider the Stop Online Piracy Act68 (SOPA). 
This recently failed legislative attempt to block access to foreign websites 
containing infringing materials heavily relied on domestic intermediaries.  
The proposed statute included a specific provision empowering a court, on 
the initiative of the attorney general, to order a search engine to avoid 
linking to a targeted website designated as a “foreign infringing site.”69  
Against the backdrop of these trends, a more robust governmental, censorial 
use of search engines in the United States does not seem farfetched.70 
The crucial point for our purposes is that when government censorship 
targets access to information by regulating the search engine’s intermediary 
 
 62. Derek E. Bambauer, Cybersieves, 59 DUKE L.J. 377, 379 (2009) (“[M]ost countries 
use cybersieves to try to filter undesirable content . . . .”). 
 63. Jonathan Zittrain, Internet Points of Control, 44 B.C. L. REV. 653, 654 (2003) 
(“[T]he Internet’s architecture has prominently stymied control efforts by those harmed by 
its less innocuous uses.”). 
 64. See generally ACCESS DENIED (Ronald Deibert et al. eds., 2008); JACK GOLDSMITH & 
TIM WU, WHO CONTROLS THE INTERNET?  ILLUSIONS OF A BORDERLESS WORLD (2006); 
INTERNET FILTERING IN CHINA IN 2004–2005:  A COUNTRY STUDY (2005), available at 
https://opennet.net/sites/opennet.net/files/ONI_China_Country_Study.pdf; Bambauer, supra 
note 62, at 379; Internet Filtering Country Profile for China, OPENNET INITIATIVE (Aug. 9 
2012), https://opennet.net/research/profiles/china-including-hong-kong. 
 65. See Bambauer, supra note 62, at 382–83. 
 66. See Ronald J. Mann & Seth R. Belzley, The Promise of Internet Intermediary 
Liability, 47 WM. & MARY L. REV. 239, 265 (2005); Zittrain, supra note 63, at 654–55; see 
also Michael D. Birnhack & Niva Elkin-Koren, The Invisible Handshake:  The Reemergence 
of the State in the Digital Environment, 8 VA. J.L. & TECH. 6, 18 (2003). 
 67. See Derek E. Bambauer, Orwell’s Armchair, 79 U. CHI. L. REV. 863, 878–82 (2012) 
(surveying examples of the censorship strategy of “deputizing intermediaries” as applied to 
ISPs). 
 68. H.R. 3261, 112th Cong. (2011). 
 69. See id. § 102(c)(2)(B). 
 70. See Bambauer, supra note 67, at 866–67 (describing America’s move “to censor the 
Internet” through intermediaries). 
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function, the relevant speech interest is that of the search engine’s 
constituencies:  the websites made invisible and the users rendered blind.  
No doubt, the First Amendment has an important role to play in this 
context.  These cases do not implicate freedom of speech, however, because 
any protected speech of the search engine is restricted.  Rather, the 
restrictions imposed on the search engine are merely tools for violating the 
speech interests of others. 
The speech interests of content providers and users, indirectly targeted in 
this way, are surely protectable by the First Amendment.  An analogous law 
prohibiting the sale of paper to a certain publisher or ordering 
manufacturers to incorporate in all TV sets a device that blocks certain 
content would, no doubt, implicate the First Amendment.71  The First 
Amendment would apply, however, not to protect any speech interest of the 
paper maker or the TV manufacturer, but rather because the regulations 
target the speech of others.72  An example closer to the search engines 
context is the aforementioned early 2000s state legislative attempt to use 
ISPs for censorial purposes.  Courts rigorously applied the First 
Amendment in those cases not because ISPs’ speech was abridged by the 
duty to block certain websites, but because the threat of ISP liability could 
be an effective tool for interfering with the speech interests of content 
creators and users.73  From the perspective of the speech interest of search 
engines’ constituencies, legal limitations on search results must be subject 
to First Amendment scrutiny for exactly the same reason. 
Identifying the relevant speech interest is not a mere technicality.  
Locating the relevant speech interest with the search engine’s constituencies 
shapes the analysis and leads to results significantly different from those 
produced by a focus on a postulated protected speech interest of the search 
engine itself.  As a threshold matter, there is the issue of standing.  Search 
engines that challenge the constitutionality of regulations applied to them 
with a First Amendment construct based on protecting the speech interests 
of users and websites are third parties asserting the rights of others who are 
the direct parties whose speech interest is at issue.  As a result, the complex 
body of law governing third party standing in First Amendment cases must 
be applied to decide whether and when search engines should be allowed to 
assert such claims on behalf of others.74 
 
 71. Cf. Minneapolis Star & Tribune Co. v. Minn. Comm’r of Revenue, 460 U.S. 575, 
591 (1983) (holding that a “use tax” on ink and paper that singled out newspapers violated 
the First Amendment). 
 72. See Robert Post, Encryption Source Code and the First Amendment, 15 BERKELEY 
TECH. L.J. 713, 721–22 (2000) (discussing First Amendment scrutiny triggered by the 
instrumental effect of a regulated subject matter on free-speech-relevant media). 
 73. See, e.g., ACLU v. Johnson, 194 F.3d 1149, 1156 (10th Cir. 1999); Ctr. for 
Democracy and Tech. v. Pappert, 337 F. Supp. 2d 606, 656 (E.D. Pa. 2004); Cyberspace 
Commc’ns, Inc. v. Engler, 55 F. Supp. 2d 737, 748–49 (E.D. Mich. 1999), aff’d, 238 F.3d 
420 (6th Cir. 2000); Am. Libraries Ass’n v. Pataki, 969 F. Supp. 160, 177 (S.D.N.Y. 1997). 
 74. Traditionally, standing to bring a suit has been reserved to a plaintiff who can “aver 
an injury peculiar to himself.” Tyler v. Judges of the Ct. of Registration, 179 U.S. 405, 406 
(1900).  But the strict requirement precluding third-party standing has softened over the last 
century in American jurisprudence. See generally Henry P. Monaghan, Third Party 
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Even assuming, arguendo, that search engines have standing, taking the 
speech interest of constituencies as the focal point of the analysis still 
matters a great deal.  One major element of the analysis where this 
difference plays out is the question of content neutrality.  Whether a 
regulation of speech is content based or content neutral determines the level 
of constitutional scrutiny applied and often decides the outcome of the First 
Amendment analysis.75  When the focus of the analysis is the speech of 
websites and users, the critical element of content neutrality has to be 
determined in reference to the speech of those parties.  From this 
perspective, many regulations that seek to use search engines as a censorial 
tool against websites’ and users’ speech will be content based and, 
therefore, subject to the exacting standard applied to such regulations.76  
Ordering search engines to exclude from their results certain materials that 
are deemed “harmful to minors,” for example, clearly targets specific 
speech on the basis of its content.  As a result, such regulations will have to 
meet a particularly stringent test to pass constitutional muster.  By contrast, 
regulations purporting to remedy alleged search engine manipulations77 will 
often be content neutral with respect to the speech of users and websites.  
For example, a general limitation on the search engine’s ability to give a 
ranking preference to its commercial allies seems to be prima facie content 
neutral in regard to the speech of the search engine’s constituencies:  the 
regulation applies completely independent of the content of websites’ or 
users’ speech.  As a result, regulations of this kind, when analyzed from the 
perspective of the search engine constituencies’ speech interests, will 
usually be scrutinized under the relatively lenient standard applicable to 
content-neutral laws and will likely pass muster.  This is not a mere quirk or 
unpredictable result of the doctrine.  As a normative matter, when the 
substantive focus is the speech of constituencies, regulations that do not 
target a particular view or content embodied in the speech of information 
providers or users are less suspicious and should be subject to the more 
lenient review standard. 
 
Standing, 84 COLUM. L. REV. 277 (1984) (chronicling the diminishing requirements needed 
for a party to assert in court the rights of another).  In First Amendment jurisprudence, the 
requirement of an injury-in-fact has been particularly blunted by several exceptions and 
mitigating doctrines. See Amato v. Wilentz, 952 F.2d 742, 748–55 (3d Cir. 1991) (discussing 
factors relevant for third-party standing in the context of the First Amendment).  For a 
discussion of third-party standing in the context of free speech overbreadth doctrine, see 
Henry Paul Monaghan, Overbreadth, 1981 SUP. CT. REV. 1. See also Richard H. Fallon, Jr., 
Making Sense of Overbreadth, 100 YALE L.J. 853 (1991); Note, Overbreadth and Listeners 
Rights, 123 HARV. L. REV. 1749 (2010). 
 75. See generally DANIEL A. FARBER, THE FIRST AMENDMENT 20 (3d ed. 2010); 1 
RODNEY A. SMOLLA, SMOLLA & NIMMER ON FREEDOM OF SPEECH § 3:1 (2012) (“The 
distinction between content-based and content-neutral regulation of speech is one of the 
central tenets of contemporary First Amendment jurisprudence.”); Martin H. Redish, The 
Content Distinction in First Amendment Analysis, 34 STAN. L. REV. 113 (1981). 
 76. See, e.g., Sable Commc’ns, Inc. v. FCC, 492 U.S. 115, 126 (1989) (“The 
Government may . . . regulate the content of constitutionally protected speech in order to 
promote a compelling interest if it chooses the least restrictive means to further the 
articulated interest.”). 
 77. See supra text accompanying notes 47–51. 
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The foregoing analysis means neither that any regulation that targets 
constituencies’ speech on the basis of its content is always unconstitutional, 
nor that any attempt to restrict search results that is content neutral in regard 
to the speech of constituencies is allowed.  Consider a hypothetical myopic 
legislator who decides that a good way of remedying what he perceives as 
the problem of search bias is to compel search engines to randomize the 
ranking of search results (whether across users or across multiple searches 
by one user).  Such a regulation is neutral in regard to the content of speech 
by the search engine’s constituencies.  But its incidental effect is potentially 
so destructive78 to the relevant speech interest—that of users to effectively 
locate sought-out websites and of websites to effectively reach interested 
audiences—that the regulation likely violates the First Amendment.79  Such 
a regulation is analogous to mandating that all books must be printed using 
dissolving ink or that all TV sets must block three channels on a random, 
rotating basis.  Not all content-neutral regulations of speech are allowed 
under the First Amendment.  Nevertheless, a focus on the speech of the 
search engines’ constituencies allows much breathing space for regulations 
that do not target the speech interest of websites or users in a content-based 
manner. 
The speech interest of the search engines’ constituencies—both 
information providers and users—merits vigilant protection against blatant 
or subtle governmental attempts to use search engines as censorial tools.  
Yet an analysis focused on this speech interest allows much room for 
regulations of search results that do not attempt to target specific speech of 
the search engine’s constituencies.  This is exactly the reason why Google 
and its defenders mostly ignored this understanding of the relevant speech 
interest in the debate over search engines’ complete control of their results.  
With a clear focus on the plausible and natural speech interests at stake—
those belonging to websites and users—the First Amendment is hardly an 
impenetrable shield against virtually any legal attempt to scrutinize search 
practices.  Hence, search engine proponents needed greener pastures in the 
form of more creative speech arguments. 
 
 78. A limited element of randomization is not necessarily destructive to the quality of 
search results, and arguably if it is well designed, it may even improve search results’ 
quality. See generally Sandeep Pandey et al., Shuffling a Stacked Deck:  The Case for 
Partially Randomized Ranking of Search Engine Results, 31 VLDB CONF. (2005) 
(suggesting that the introduction of a controlled amount of randomness into search result 
ranking methods may improve their quality). 
 79. In doctrinal terms, such regulation is likely to fail one of the prongs of the test 
applied to content-neutral laws because it is probably not narrowly tailored to achieve the 
legitimate state interest underlying it. See Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 
662 (1994) (“[A] content-neutral regulation will be sustained if ‘it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.’” (quoting United States v. 
O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367, 377 (1968))). 
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2.  The Editorial Search Engine 
How could the speech interest of the search engine itself, rather than that 
of its constituencies, be the center of First Amendment analysis?  One 
answer that has emerged in the recent search battles is to treat the search 
engine as an editor of content—the equivalent of the New York Times or an 
organizer of a parade.80  This construct separates the speech and the speech 
interest.  The relevant speech is that of the websites indexed by the search 
engine, but the protected speech interest belongs to the search engine itself 
in its editorial capacity.  This move builds on a strand of the case law that 
extends First Amendment protection to editors’ discretion to control their 
speech venue by deciding what speech to include or exclude.  The seminal 
case is Miami Herald Publishing Co. v. Tornillo,81 where the Supreme 
Court found unconstitutional a “right of reply” statute that compelled 
newspapers to publish responses to certain included content.82 
The Tornillo rule combines two analytically distinct elements.  The first 
is the assumption that freedom of speech is not limited to censorial attempts 
to suppress certain speech, but extends also to attempts to compel speech. 
The underlying rationale is that genuine freedom to express one’s ideas and 
views includes a negative as well as a positive dimension.  Truly protecting 
this freedom requires both that individuals can choose what to say and that 
they are free to decide what not to say.83  By extension, this rationale also 
applies to attempts to dictate the mode of inclusion or prominence given to 
certain content.84  The second element of the rule is that it applies not just 
to cases where someone is compelled to generate certain content or directly 
express it, but also to cases where one is compelled to include, within her 
speech venue, other speakers’ generated and expressed speech.85  While 
newspapers are the classic editorial entities enjoying protection against 
compelled speech generated by others, the rule has been extended to other 
entities, including the organizers of parades,86 and even business entities 
 
 80. See generally VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 51; Bruce D. Brown & Alan B. 
Davidson, Is Google Like Gas or Like Steel?, N.Y. TIMES, Jan. 5, 2013, at A17 (“[S]earch 
engines need to make choices about what results are most relevant to a query, just as a news 
editor must decide which stories deserve to be on the front page.”).  The editor argument also 
animates the Langdon decision, although the opinion simply cites several cases involving 
compelled speech of editors and leaves its underlying reasoning somewhat obscure. See 
Langdon v. Google, 474 F. Supp. 2d 622, 629 (D. Del. 2007). 
 81. 418 U.S. 241 (1974). 
 82. Id. at 258. 
 83. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 573–74 
(1995); Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 11 (1986) (“[A]ll speech 
inherently involves choices of what to say and what to leave unsaid.”); W. Va. State Bd. of 
Educ. v. Barnette, 319 U.S. 624, 645 (1943) (Murphy, J., concurring) (“[The First 
Amendment] includes both the right to speak freely and the right to refrain from speaking at 
all.”). 
 84. See Miami Herald, 418 U.S. at 258; VOLOKH & FALK, supra note 51, at 8–9. 
 85. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 570 (holding that “an edited compilation of speech generated 
by other persons” is protected under the First Amendment). 
 86. See id. at 557. 
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distributing standard informational materials.87  One federal district court 
has already ruled that search engines’ results are protected speech under this 
logic, although in a conclusory manner and without clarifying the exact 
nature of the relevant speech.88  The court in Langdon v. Google, Inc., 
citing to the editorial rights of newspapers cases, found that any attempt to 
interfere with the search engine’s discretion over its results through 
injunctive relief “would compel it to speak” and is therefore precluded by 
the First Amendment.89 
At first blush, recasting search engines as editors may seem a winning 
move.  A search engine, no doubt, selects (by way of inclusion in and 
exclusion from the search results) and arranges (by way of ranking) the 
content of websites to which users arrive through its services.  In this 
limited sense, search results constitute an editorial product.  Any attempt to 
deny the search engine the protection extended to other editors may seem 
based on irrelevant distinctions that have no foothold in the law, such as the 
fact that search results are produced by a computer algorithm or that their 
creation involves interaction with users.  But such a hasty conclusion 
ignores both legal doctrine and the rationale behind it.  The case law in this 
area extends protection to one entity vis-à-vis speech generated and 
expressed by others on the basis of an explicit rationale:  the existence of a 
layer of expression that is attributable to the editorial entity itself, rather 
than to those who generated the speech.  Just as the case law acknowledges 
that this rationale requires extending the rule to contexts beyond the core 
case of a newspaper, it also warns against applying the rule where the 
rationale does not apply.90 
When does the rationale based on the assumption of an expressive layer 
attributable to the editor apply?  Two main situations appear in the case 
law, neither of which is applicable to search engines.  The first and most 
common situation is when the entity that controls the speech venue, by 
virtue of its editorial position, is likely to be associated with the content.91  
We plausibly speak of a New York Times article even when the author of 
the article is not an employee of the Times.  It is plausible that many 
associate the New York Times with its op-eds, and even with the 
 
 87. See Pac. Gas, 475 U.S. at 1. 
 88. Langdon v. Google, Inc., 474 F. Supp. 2d 622 (D. Del. 2007). 
 89. Id. at 629–30. 
 90. See Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic & Institutional Rights, Inc., 547 U.S. 47, 62 
(2006) (holding that a law denying federal funds to higher education institutions that refused 
on-campus access to military recruiters “is a far cry from the compelled speech” precedents); 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc. v. FCC, 512 U.S. 622, 655–57 (1994) (distinguishing a regulation of 
a cable provider from compelled speech precedents). 
 91. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65 (holding that the compelled speech rule does not apply 
where there is little likelihood that “the views of those engaging in the expressive activities 
would be identified” with the venue owner); Hurley, 515 U.S. at 575 (observing that 
admitting the plaintiff to the parade was likely to be perceived as a result of the organizer’s 
determination “that its message was worthy of presentation and quite possibly of support as 
well”); Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655 (holding that the rule against compelled 
speech does not apply when there is little risk that cable viewers would think that must-carry 
channels “convey ideas or messages endorsed by the cable operator”). 
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advertisements it carries, even if they understand that the content was not 
produced by its employees.  Given the practices of journalism, the 
newspaper is seen as endorsing the speech, or at least as associating itself 
with it in a meaningful way.  This rationale may apply in other contexts 
beyond the core case of a newspaper, but it does not apply in all cases when 
a speech venue is forced to host unwanted content.  Most people do not 
associate a Yellow Pages directory with the speech offered by the entities 
listed in it, even if the directory engages in some selection and arrangement 
of its index.  The Court has refused to apply editorial speech protection in 
cases in which the relevant entity is unlikely to be seen as an editor of the 
speech in the sense of being plausibly associated with it by others.92 
Two related criteria, developed by courts for separating the goats, where 
this rationale does not apply, from the sheep, where it mandates protection, 
point in a clear direction when applied to the case of search engines.  First, 
no compelled speech argument lies where there is “little likelihood that the 
views of those engaging in the expressive activities would be identified 
with” the entity claiming the protection of the First Amendment.93  In 
Rumsfeld v. Forum for Academic and Institutional Rights, the Supreme 
Court rejected an argument by law schools that the First Amendment 
protected their right to exclude military recruiters from campus because 
allowing their presence could send a message of identification with the 
military’s “don’t ask, don’t tell” policy.94  The Court distinguished the 
compelled speech precedents by observing, “Nothing about recruiting 
suggests that law schools agree with any speech by recruiters” and that 
nothing “restricts what the law schools may say about the military’s 
policies.”95 
Search engines stand in a similar position in regard to the content of 
individual websites they index.  Users are unlikely to associate the content 
of indexed websites with the search engine.  Nor do they have a plausible 
reason to do so.  Because of their “advisory” function,96 search engines play 
a somewhat more active role than cable providers, which are seen in the 
case law as the paradigmatic example of completely passive conduits for 
delivering content by others.97  Nevertheless, in regard to the crucial 
element of an association with the content being carried or linked, search 
engines are the equivalent of cable providers.  This follows from the nature 
of the “advice” provided by search engines.  The ideal function of the 
search engine for its users is in locating materials most relevant for their 
own preferences.  Rather than providing its own evaluation and 
endorsement of websites or trying to convince users of particular 
assessments of their content, the search engine tries to present to the user 
 
 92. See Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 62–65; Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655–56; 
PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). 
 93. Rumsfeld, 547 U.S. at 65. 
 94. Id. at 64–65. 
 95. Id. at 65. 
 96. See supra text accompanying notes 42–43. 
 97. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 553, 576 (1995); 
Turner Broad. Sys., Inc., 512 U.S. at 655. 
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links to the content most relevant for her own subjective preferences, as 
inferred from the search term and other relevant data.98  At play here is the 
difference between you responding to me asking which is the best movie in 
town with an enthusiastic recommendation, and you naming three movies in 
response to my question:  “You know my idiosyncratic taste in movies, 
which ones do you think I’ll enjoy the most?”  Search engines are 
analogous to the latter case.  It is their “mind-reading” quality, at least as 
they are perceived by users, that makes it highly unlikely that users 
associate the search engine with the content of the websites it lists or 
assume any endorsement or editorial discretion in regard to such content.99  
In some cases, search engines receive substantial public criticism over the 
material they list and link to in their search results.100  There is a crucial 
difference, however, between associating a controversial content of a listed 
website with the search engine and recognizing that the search engine has 
the power to reduce the visibility of this content.  The best-known public 
claims against Google in such cases seem to be in the latter vein.101 
In other contexts, search engines stress their disassociation from the 
content they list and rely on that disassociation.  To avoid liability 
stemming from the content they index, usually under tort or intellectual 
property laws, search engines regularly take the position that they are not 
associated with that content as either publishers or editors.102  It is hardly 
 
 98. See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 894 (“The entire point of consulting a search 
engine is that the user specifies her own interests—not someone else’s—in the search query 
and receives results relating to those interests.”). 
 99. Eric Goldman, Search Engine Bias and the Demise of Search Engine Utopianism, 8 
YALE J.L. & TECH. 188, 198 (2006) (referring to the “mind reading abilities” of search 
engines).  In practice, search engines’ ranking is not completely deferential to users’ 
preferences and interests.  But to maintain their appeal and avoid losing users, search engines 
must maintain both the user perception of fidelity to users’ interests and a considerable 
degree of actual such fidelity. Cf. id. at 196 (“Search engines that disappoint . . . are 
accountable to fickle searchers.”). 
 100. Famously, in 2004, Google came under fire when it was revealed that the search 
results for the term “Jew” listed at a high rank a highly anti-Semitic website.  Following a 
public outcry, Google resisted demands for removing the controversial result and published 
an online statement called An Explanation of Our Search Results, in which it explained, 
“The beliefs and preferences of those who work at Google, as well as the opinions of the 
general public, do not determine or impact our search results.” See An Explanation of Our 
Search Results, GOOGLE, http://www.google.com/explanation.html (last visited Feb. 24, 
2014).  For a discussion of the public controversy, see SIVA VAIDHYANATHAN, THE 
GOOGLIZATION OF EVERYTHING (AND WHY WE SHOULD WORRY) 64–66 (2011). 
 101. See VAIDHYANATHAN, supra note 100, at 66 (criticizing Google for the high 
visibility of an anti-Semitic website in response to certain search queries because the results 
“are clearly within Google’s control”). 
 102. See Parker v. Google, Inc., 242 F. App’x 833, 835 (3d Cir. 2007).  Search engines 
rely on two main statutory safe havens in this context.  Section 230 of the Communication 
Decency Act mandates that the provider of an “interactive computer service” shall not be 
treated as the speaker or publisher of any information provided by another. 47 U.S.C. 
§ 230(c)(1) (2006).  Section 512(d) of the Digital Millennium Copyright Act immunizes 
providers of “information location tools” from monetary relief for copyright infringement. 
17 U.S.C. § 512(d) (2012).  A search engine does not qualify for the immunity under certain 
circumstances, including when it has actual or constructive knowledge of the infringing 
activity.  Withdrawing the immunity where the search engine possesses knowledge and 
allowing certain injunctive relief is consistent with the treatment of the search engine as a 
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consistent for search engines to disclaim the legal responsibilities of editors 
and publishers while also claiming the free speech protection extended to 
them.103 
Some auxiliary indicators that courts sometimes find relevant to the 
question of association between a presumed editor and compelled content 
point in the same direction.  In the unlikely event that a concern of 
association between the search engine and indexed content does arise, 
search engines can easily disavow any such connection.104  Similarly, 
should a search engine choose to provide its own speech, either by way of 
supplying alternative content to indexed websites or as substantive 
endorsements of websites, nothing in the regulations contemplated here 
interferes with its ability to do so.105 
The second situation where courts are willing to assume a separate layer 
of expression attributable to the editor is when the edited content constitutes 
a collective expressive entity—a whole that is greater, or at least distinct, 
from the sum of its parts.  The case law distinguishes between two kinds of 
expressive venues.  The first is a mere content aggregator, which just 
collects expressive materials as discrete audience-selectable units.  The 
second is a content compiler, which collects and combines content into a 
collective whole imbued with an overarching meaning.106  In the latter case, 
even when the entity controlling the venue is not required to express 
endorsement of any particular material and is not likely to be seen as its 
originator, specific speech is forced upon it.  The audience may still 
plausibly associate this entity with the expressive whole because of its 
editorial capacity in shaping its meaning.  The meaning of this whole is 
necessarily shaped by the units included in it, contrary to the editor’s 
preference.  Thus, in Hurley v. Irish-American Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual 
Group, the Supreme Court found that a parade organizer had a protected 
First Amendment interest to exclude a gay organization from participating 
in the parade because “[u]nlike the programming offered on various 
channels by a cable network, the parade does not consist of individual, 
unrelated segments that happen to be transmitted together for individual 
selection by members of the audience.”107  Irrespective of the attribution of 
any individual unit, the court explained, “the parade’s overall message is 
 
passive instrument for reaching content rather than a publisher or editor associated with it.  A 
duty to act in cases of knowledge under threat of liability and injunctive relief ordering the 
disabling of access to linked content treat the search engine as an enforcement tool rather 
than an entity associated with the content.  This roughly tracks the concept of treating the 
search engine as an important instrument that affects the speech interest of others in the First 
Amendment context. See supra text accompanying notes 62–73.  First Amendment 
protection that is focused on the speech interest of search engine constituencies and the 
limited liability for infringing content are thus matching aspects of seeing the search engine 
as an instrumentality for speech by others rather than a speaker, editor, or publisher. 
 103. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1192–93; Wu, supra note 24, at 1528–29. 
 104. See Hurley v. Irish-Am. Gay, Lesbian & Bisexual Grp., 515 U.S. 557, 576 (1995). 
 105. See id. at 580; Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. Pub. Util. Comm’n, 475 U.S. 1, 23–24 
(1986); PruneYard Shopping Ctr. v. Robins, 447 U.S. 74, 87 (1980). 
 106. See Hurley, 515 U.S. at 576–77. 
 107. Id. at 576. 
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distilled from the individual presentations along the way, and each unit’s 
expression is perceived by spectators as part of the whole.”108  In short, 
whether or not the editor is seen as endorsing a specific unit, the forced 
inclusion of a unit changes the overall meaning of the whole.  Critically, 
however, this only applies where there is an overarching expressive whole 
that is attributable to the editor, unlike in the case of the cable provider. 
Search engines are aggregators, rather than compilers.  Websites indexed 
by search engines, unlike a parade or a newspaper, lack the quality of an 
integrated expressive whole with which the entity controlling the venue is 
associated.  While the search engine selects and hierarchically organizes the 
items listed in search results, users do not perceive the websites linked in 
them as an integrated whole with an overarching meaning.  No one runs a 
Bing search to experience the overall meaning of a “compilation” made of 
the group of websites collected by the results of the search.  And if someone 
does, she is unlikely to see Microsoft as the editor of this postulated 
“compilation” of websites.  Websites on search results, much like the 
individual channels of a cable provider, are discrete units offered for 
selection by users.  If users likely do not associate search engines with the 
content of individual websites, then this is the end of the analysis.  Unlike 
the parade in Hurley, there is no greater expressive whole with which a 
search engine is likely to be associated whose meaning is shaped by the 
forced inclusion of a unit. 
In sum, when the speech embodied in indexed websites is taken as the 
relevant frame of reference, search engines do not qualify for First 
Amendment protection given to editors against compelled speech.109  
Search engines are not plausibly associated with the content of indexed 
websites or seen as endorsing this content.  Nor is there any integrated 
expressive whole attributable to the search engine whose meaning is altered 
by a forced inclusion irrespective of association of the search engine with 
individual expressive units. 
3.  The Opinionated Search Engine 
Setting aside either search engines’ constituencies or the search engine in 
an editorial capacity as the protected speech interest, one last speech 
argument remains.  This is, by far, the most creative, powerful, and 
dangerous argument.  It argues that each search result ranking embodies 
implied observations of relevance in response to the search query, and that 
these observations are protectable speech.  Thus, in 2003, a federal district 
court found that Google’s search results rankings “are opinions—opinions 
of the significance of particular web sites as they correspond to a search 
query,” and that “[o]ther search engines express different opinions” based 
 
 108. Id. at 577. 
 109. A number of scholars have come to the same conclusion. See Bracha & Pasquale, 
supra note 44, at 1190–92; Chandler, supra note 52, at 1126–29; Wu, supra note 24, at 
1528–29. 
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on their methods of ranking websites.110  The argument rests on the premise 
that search results presented to users contain several layers of meaning.  
The top layer of meaning—that of denotation—consists of the immediate 
meaning communicated to users by the textual or visual information 
presented.111  In textual searches, this typically includes the title of indexed 
websites, their URLs, and a short description.  But this information (that the 
indexed websites themselves typically generate) is not the speech in which 
protection is claimed.  The underlying layer of meaning—that of 
connotation—contains a different expressive message:  propositions about 
the order of relevance of the listed websites for users’ preferences in the 
context of the particular search query.112  This connotative meaning can be 
stylistically represented as:  “website X is most relevant to this user in 
regard to this search; website Y is next in relevance; etc.”  This meaning 
that is clearly generated by the search engine itself, the argument goes, is 
the protected speech. 
This construct offers the best of all possible universes from the point of 
view of search engines. Unlike the editorial search engine argument, it 
identifies the protected speech with expression directly generated by the 
search engine, thereby avoiding the fatal flaw of claiming protection vis-à-
vis speech whose association with the search engine is dubious.  By contrast 
to the construct focusing on the speech of search engines’ constituencies, it 
locates the protected speech interest with the search engine, thereby making 
almost any attempt to limit search engine discretion suspect.  When 
observations of relevance are taken as the protected expression, almost any 
imaginable interference with the search engine’s control of its results is 
inexorably intertwined with an abridgment of its speech.  An external 
constraint shaping the search results in any way necessarily shapes the 
observations of relevance embodied in them.  Moreover, since the 
observations of relevance are targeted because of their content, any 
regulation of the kind contemplated by this Article is content based in 
respect to this expression and therefore subject to the more exacting level of 
scrutiny.  In short, this version of the First Amendment argument, if 
successful, emerges as a true doomsday weapon capable of quashing any 
attempt to limit search engines’ absolute discretion over their results. 
But is the argument successful?  Are implied observations of relevance 
the kind of speech that the First Amendment protects?  Professor Stuart 
Benjamin has recently answered this question with a resounding yes.113  
According to Benjamin, First Amendment jurisprudence criteria 
determining what kind of speech receives protection yield a clear result in 
 
 110. Search King, Inc. v. Google Tech., Inc., No. CIV-02-1457-M, 2003 U.S. Dist. 
LEXIS 27193, at *11 (W.D. Okla. Oct. 17, 2002). 
 111. On denotation, see ROLAND BARTHES, ELEMENTS OF SEMIOLOGY 89–90 (Annette 
Lavers & Colin Smith trans., 1983). 
 112. On connotation, see id. 
 113. Benjamin, supra note 16, at 1446–67. 
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this case.114  Protected speech under the First Amendment includes any 
communication of a substantive message from a speaker to a listener who 
can potentially recognize the message.115  This broad definition of covered 
speech is limited only by a narrow and strict list of well-recognized 
exceptions such as obscenity or sedition.116  Courts are hostile to any 
attempt to expand this narrow list of exceptions.  In a series of recent 
decisions, the Supreme Court demonstrated such hostility when it 
adamantly rejected any attempt to expand the limited list of categories of 
uncovered speech or to restrict protection to speech not within these 
categories on the basis of various distinctions.117 
Arguably, the application of this framework to our context is 
straightforward.  Implied observations of relevance embodied in search 
results communicate a substantive message from the search engine, a 
message that is potentially understandable and, most often, actually 
understandable by users.  This communication does not fall within any of 
the traditional categories of speech excluded from the ambit of the First 
Amendment.  No other distinction, such as the existence or absence of a 
clear articulable viewpoint or the subject matter of the message, is relevant.  
Therefore, search engine rankings constitute protected speech under the 
First Amendment.  End of debate. 
Except that it is not.  As a doctrinal matter, applicable law, far from being 
as clear as the above analysis implies, constitutes one of the darkest and 
most obscure corners of First Amendment doctrine.  Underlying normative 
considerations point clearly against construing the relevant rules in a way 
that extends First Amendment protection to search engines’ implied 
observations of relevance and to a large universe of similar communication.  
And existing law already contains, in an embryonic form, the mechanisms 
for denying First Amendment protection to this sort of communication 
without running the risks that the Supreme Court’s narrow approach to 
categories of excluded speech is designed to avoid.  The remainder of this 
Article elaborates, in turn, on each of these propositions. 
 
 114. See id. at 1447 (“[T]he First Amendment encompasses a great swath of algorithm-
based decisions—specifically, algorithm-based outputs that entail a substantive 
communication.”). 
 115. See id. at 1458–61.  The seminal Supreme Court case often read as standing for this 
proposition is Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–11 (1974) (holding that the First 
Amendment applies when “[a]n intent to convey a particularized message was present, and 
in the surrounding circumstances the likelihood was great that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it”). 
 116. United States v. Stevens, 130 S. Ct. 1577, 1584 (2010) (describing a limited list of 
“historic and traditional categories [of excluded speech] long familiar to the bar”). 
 117. Id. at 1586 (rejecting “a freewheeling authority to declare new categories of speech 
outside the scope of the First Amendment”); see also United States v. Alvarez, 132 S. Ct. 
2537, 2547 (2012); Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011) (“[N]ew 
categories of unprotected speech may not be added to the list by a legislature that concludes 
certain speech is too harmful to be tolerated.”). 
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II.  WHY SEARCH ENGINE RANKINGS ARE NOT PROTECTABLE SPEECH 
As a doctrinal matter, it is far from clear that First Amendment law 
extends protection to implied observations of relevance embodied in search 
results.  In part, free speech protection is limited because the regulation 
might be targeting one of the traditional categories of unprotected speech.  
Under current circumstances, much of the communication singled out for 
regulation is likely to constitute deception or fraud—a category of speech in 
regard to which First Amendment exclusionary rules allow much leeway 
for regulation.118  In the long run, however, deception may be an unreliable 
foundation.  Changed circumstances may eliminate the deceptive nature of 
certain manipulations of search results but not the manipulation.  Moreover, 
the concept of deception is ill suited for dealing with the greater 
implications of the extremely broad interpretation of the First Amendment 
claimed by proponents of search engines’ speech. 
A more fundamental basis for excluding search ranking is the concept of 
First Amendment coverage.  Many commentators acknowledge that the 
First Amendment does not cover a vast amount of communication that is 
well beyond the traditional categories of excluded speech.119  The 
regulation of uncovered speech does not trigger any level of First 
Amendment scrutiny.120  Unfortunately, legal doctrine on this subject is 
opaque.  In the rare cases when courts have to deal with arguments about 
uncovered speech, they typically use evasive measures and technical 
classifications to avoid free speech analysis.121  The sweeping claim for 
protection of search engine speech no longer allows obscuring the question 
of coverage in this way.  The only satisfactory way of answering the 
question, for whose resolution no clear guidance exists in the case law, is 
through normative analysis.  Building on Robert Post’s concept of First 
Amendment–relevant social practices, I argue that a close look at the actual 
social practices of search engine “opinions” reveals no normative ground 
for their inclusion within the protective zone of freedom of speech.  
Moreover, the broader implications of such an inclusion may be disastrous.  
Implied observations of relevance of the kind embodied in search results are 
found almost everywhere.  If the First Amendment is construed to cover 
such speech, almost no social or economic practice will be beyond its reach, 
and almost no governmental, economic, or social regulation will be free of 
the exacting standard of First Amendment scrutiny. 
These arguments hinge on the specific social practices of search engine 
speech, not on the abstract quality of the speech as having been generated 
by a computer algorithm.  As such, this analysis operates on a much more 
 
 118. See infra text accompanying notes 122–23. 
 119. See infra notes 149–50. 
 120. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1769 (explaining that, when a case is not covered by 
the First Amendment, “the entire event—an event that often involves ‘speech’ in the 
ordinary language sense of the word—does not present a First Amendment issue at all, and 
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 121. See infra notes 153–54. 
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fine-grained level than arguments that treat “algorithmic speech” or 
“machine speech” as homogenous categories that determine whether the 
First Amendment applies.  My argument is that the specific social practices 
of search engine ranking are not sufficiently connected to any free speech 
values to justify First Amendment coverage.  It leaves open the possibility 
that other forms of algorithm and machine speech are covered by the First 
Amendment.  What matters is not the general characterization of speech as 
algorithmic, but rather the specific social interactions between speakers and 
users within which it takes place. 
A.  Fraud 
James Grimmelmann has recently explained that much of the 
manipulation under attack by critics of search engines may actually 
constitute deception of users.122  How is deception possible in regard to 
opinions of relevance?  As one federal court observed in Search King, Inc. 
v. Google Technology, Inc.,123 search results are “fundamentally subjective 
in nature” because “every algorithm employed by every search engine is 
different, and will produce a different representation of the relative 
significance of a particular web site depending on the various factors.”124  
There is no single, correct, objective answer to the question of relevance, 
and therefore it seems that there are no false answers.  The point of the 
Search King court’s reference to search ranking as subjective “opinions” is 
to classify it as the equivalent of beliefs, values, and taste-judgments where 
“there is no such thing as a false idea,” in contrast to “false statements of 
fact.”125  What work can the concept of deception do in regard to such 
subjective approximations of relevance?  As Grimmelmann explains, even 
in the absence of an objective yardstick for relevance, rankings can still be 
subjectively false.  This happens when a search engine changes the ranking 
of a website in a way that is inconsistent with its “own assessment of 
relevance.”126  Search engines represent both explicitly and implicitly that 
their results are based on relevance to users,127 so producing results that by 
the search engine’s own lights do not meet this criterion is a false 
representation. 
Grimmelmann sees deception predominantly as a litmus test for deciding 
when, as a policy matter, interfering with the search engine’s discretion is 
justified.  But the category of deception has another merit:  it happens to be 
one of the traditionally recognized content-based categories where courts, at 
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least when some additional elements are present, are willing to limit the 
application of the First Amendment.  The U.S. Supreme Court has observed 
that “[u]ntruthful speech, commercial or otherwise, has never been 
protected for its own sake,”128 and has consistently mentioned this category 
as one of the limited areas where the law has “permitted restrictions upon 
the content of speech.”129  As the Court recently emphasized, false speech 
is not excluded wholesale from protection under the First Amendment.130  
Thus the intersection between the First Amendment and civil wrongs 
involving misrepresentation is more complex than a sweeping denial of 
First Amendment protection to any false communication.  In fact, the case 
law requires varying degrees of fault for imposing constitutionally sound 
civil liability, depending on various factors, such as the nature and context 
of the speech, the wrong involved, and the remedy sought.131  This makes 
little difference in our context, however.  Search results deception ipso facto 
involves the highest degree of fault:  knowing, intentional misrepresentation 
or “malice.”  The falsity here requires a representation that rankings are 
based solely on relevance, when knowingly, under the search engine’s own 
subjective criteria, they are not.  Malice—the highest degree of fault applied 
by courts—is built into the definition.132  It follows that when the regulation 
at issue targets deception by search engines, any First Amendment defense 
falls flat. 
Deception is an important concept that can serve as a temporary stopgap 
measure for neutralizing the debilitating effect of the First Amendment on 
any regulation of search results.  Presently, many of the practices that critics 
of search engine manipulation seek to regulate may be fairly described as 
involving fraud in the sense explained above.  For several reasons, 
however, it is a partial remedy and in the long run probably no remedy at 
all. 
First, there may be policy reasons, both user oriented and website 
oriented, for restricting certain manipulations of search results independent 
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of a concern about fraud or misrepresentation.133  To the extent that 
regulations motivated by these reasons target practices that do not involve 
fraud per se, they can no longer enjoy this escape route from the shadow of 
the First Amendment. 
Second, and more fundamentally, as explained below, the broad theory 
behind the opinions of relevance argument threatens to extends First 
Amendment scrutiny to vast areas of economic and social regulation, well 
beyond the realm of search engine ranking.134  Even those whose concern 
in the search engine context is limited to fraud may recognize other policy 
interests worthy of protection in this broader context.  Yet if its application 
is only limited by the fraud category, the First Amendment will form a 
formidable barrier for regulation in those other areas. 
Most importantly, deception is a dynamic concept, dependent on 
contingent social circumstances.  What is deceptive today, especially on the 
basis of implicit representations, may not be deceptive tomorrow when 
social circumstances and public expectations shift.  As Ellen Goodman 
explains in the analogous context of stealth marketing, “[c]onsumer savvy 
reduces deception by unmasking what was once hidden.”135  Whether users 
assume that search results are solely based on relevance and are completely 
free of bad faith deviance from that criterion is an empirical question.  
However, to the extent that complaints about search engine manipulation 
become more publicly visible, as they have in recent years, public 
skepticism is likely to grow.  As users become less trusting of search 
engines’ practices, they are less likely to expect purely relevance-based 
ranking, and therefore they are less likely to be deceived when results are in 
fact not purely relevance based.136  Whether we have reached this point is 
debatable, but deception alone becomes a shaky long-term foundation for 
escaping First Amendment scrutiny. 
Note that even those whose policy concerns focus solely on deceptive 
search engine practices are unlikely to be consoled by deception dissolving 
simply due to a changing baseline of public skepticism. As a policy 
concern, opacity is just as bad as full-fledged fraud.  Users who expect 
search engines to deviate from strict relevance-based results are not 
deceived when this, in fact, happens.  If I tell you, “I recommend to you this 
model of a vacuum cleaner on the basis of an undisclosed mixture of 
considerations about your own preferences and my personal interests,” I am 
not deceiving you.  You may regard the recommendation (and my personal 
character) as dubious and (rightly) feel manipulated, but you have no claim 
of deception.137  Users, however, are still harmed under these 
 
 133. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1171–79 (discussing various policy 
concerns applicable to search ranking manipulation); Pasquale, supra note 43, at 112–24 
(same). 
 134. See infra text accompanying notes 155–58. 
 135. Ellen P. Goodman, Stealth Marketing and Editorial Integrity, 85 TEX. L. REV. 83, 
112 (2006). 
 136. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177. 
 137. Thus, Grimmelmann is too quick to argue that to be a disclaimer effective at 
revealing the search engine’s incomplete adherence to user’s relevance “would need to 
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circumstances, especially when they have no idea how the results deviate 
from a strict relevance standard.  The harm is twofold.  First, users receive 
results that (by the search engine’s own lights) are less than fully geared 
toward serving their interest.  Second, this dynamic will likely result in 
more general erosion of users’ trust in search results, which would be 
attributable to their growing expectation of manipulation.138  Ironically, the 
latter harm is exacerbated when users are not deceived, but are kept in the 
dark in regard to the details of the manipulations to which they are 
subjected.  There are, in short, substantial harms associated with 
manipulation.139  But it is unlikely that courts, employing their narrow and 
guarded approach to excluded categories of speech, will be willing to 
interpret the category of fraud broadly as encompassing cases of 
manipulation through opacity not involving fraud in the strict sense. 
As the likelihood of fraud dissipates with shifting public expectations, so 
does the impediment for applying the First Amendment.  The net result is 
that deception-based analysis has little mitigating effect on the far-reaching 
use of the First Amendment. In the short run, the exclusion of deceptive 
speech does not save a broad array of regulations, beyond the context of 
search, from the incredibly broad theory of freedom of speech on which the 
claim for search results as protected opinions rests.  In the long run, it does 
not even save antideception-oriented regulations of search engine ranking. 
B.  Coverage 
The fatal flaw of the opinionated search engine construct resides on a 
more fundamental level of First Amendment doctrine.  It is possible to read 
certain Supreme Court opinions as affirming an extremely expansive 
version of the scope of the First Amendment.140  One recent example is the 
Supreme Court’s decision in Sorrell v. IMS Health Inc.,141 commonly read 
as standing for the broad proposition that any information is speech 
protected under the First Amendment.142  Taking this proposition together 
 
affirmatively reveal the other considerations entering into a ranking.” Grimmelmann, supra 
note 12, at 931.  An explicit disclaimer or, alternatively, a general public awareness, under 
which users become aware of incomplete adherence to relevance but are kept in the dark 
about its details puts an end to deception in the strict sense.  Manipulation may still persist in 
the absence of a detailed disclosure.  While manipulation may be a policy concern, unlike 
deception, it is unlikely to be a ground for removing otherwise applicable First Amendment 
protection from speech. 
 138. See Goodman, supra note 135, at 113 (describing in the analogous context of stealth 
marketing how widespread public skepticism results in harm to public discourse because it 
“degrades a communications environment in which participants are unnecessarily 
disbelieving”). 
 139. See Bracha & Pasquale, supra note 44, at 1177–79 (describing manipulation of 
search results as harm to users’ autonomy). 
 140. See Benjamin, supra note 16, at 1455 (observing that it is striking “how broadly the 
Court has interpreted the scope of the Free Speech Clause, particularly in recent years, with 
the result that one can fairly answer most of the questions about algorithms without relying 
on any particular theories of the First Amendment”). 
 141. 131 S. Ct. 2653 (2011) (“[C]reation and dissemination of information are speech 
within the meaning of the First Amendment.”). 
 142. Id. at 2667. 
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with other recent decisions that emphasize the narrow nature of excluded 
categories of speech,143 one may conclude that Supreme Court 
jurisprudence conclusively disposes of the question of search ranking as 
protected speech.  Yet, when these decisions are read against the broader 
background of First Amendment law, some aspects of which they never 
directly addressed, their supposed literal and conclusive resolution of the 
question of search engine speech dissolves.  Specifically, these Supreme 
Court decisions did not address the issue of First Amendment coverage. 
It is widely acknowledged that the First Amendment does not cover all 
instances of regulatory constraints on communication that falls within the 
case law’s broad definition of expression.144  In a typical recent case, the 
Seventh Circuit described a claim that a prison deprived a prisoner of his 
First Amendment rights by preventing him from ordering his broker to sell 
stock as “absurd”; this, explained Judge Richard Posner, “is not the kind of 
verbal act that the First Amendment protects.”145  But the prisoner’s verbal 
order clearly constitutes a substantive message communicated to another by 
whom it is potentially understandable.  It certainly satisfies the oft-quoted 
Spence v. Washington test for speech requiring an “intent to convey a 
particularized message” and likelihood “that the message would be 
understood by those who viewed it.”146  Nor does the communication fall 
within one of the traditional categories of excluded speech.  How then could 
the court so easily dismiss the free speech claim as “absurd”? 
The answer is simple:  contrary to Professor Benjamin’s assertion,147 not 
every communication that qualifies as speech and falls outside the excluded 
categories is protected by the First Amendment.  Scholars have long 
acknowledged that satisfying the definition of speech is not a sufficient 
condition for triggering the First Amendment.148  They refer to the 
boundary separating abridgment of speech that triggers the First 
Amendment from that which does not as “coverage.”149  Uncovered speech 
is the dark matter of freedom of speech.  It is everywhere in vast amounts, 
but it is almost never noticed.150  It includes an enormous quantity of 
communication that falls within the definition of speech, such as speech 
restricted by securities regulation, speech within the ambit of regulation of 
 
 143. See cases cited supra notes 85–87. 
 144. See generally sources cited infra notes 149–50. 
 145. King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 146. Spence v. Washington, 418 U.S. 405, 410–12 (1974). 
 147. See supra text accompanying notes 113–15. 
 148. Post, supra note 22, at 1252 (“[The test for speech] cannot plausibly be said to 
express a sufficient condition for bringing ‘the First Amendment into play.’”). 
 149. See FREDERICK SCHAUER, FREE SPEECH:  A PHILOSOPHICAL ENQUIRY 89–92 (1982); 
Kent Greenawalt, Criminal Coercion and Freedom of Speech, 78 NW. U. L. REV. 1081, 
1089–90 (1983) (discussing “[b]oundaries questions about the first amendment”); Post, 
supra note 72, at 713; Frederick Schauer, Categories and the First Amendment:  A Play in 
Three Acts, 34 VAND. L. REV. 265, 267–82 (1981); see also Post, supra note 22; Schauer, 
supra note 20. 
 150. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1768 (“[T]he speech with which the First Amendment 
deals is the exception and the speech that may routinely be regulated is the rule.”). 
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various professionals, or speech that constitutes criminal conspiracy and 
solicitation.151 
Thus, free speech jurisprudence contains two filters that prevent the 
triggering of First Amendment scrutiny even when regulation of 
communication within the definition of speech is involved.  The more 
visible filter is that of exclusionary categories.  But the second filter—that 
of coverage—removes from First Amendment scrutiny a vastly greater 
amount of speech.  Frequently, this second filter remains unnoticed because 
it is hardly ever challenged.152  In the rare cases when a creative litigant 
tries to claim protection in such speech, courts summarily reject the 
argument with little fanfare in various ways.  In one case, such an argument 
was simply dismissed as “absurd.”153  At other times, courts employ 
various mechanisms that magically cause freedom of speech questions to 
disappear, such as classifying a case as being about product liability for a 
defective tool rather than regulation of speech.154  As a result, the case law 
contains little elaborate reasoning or concrete guidance on how to detect or 
apply the boundary that separates covered from uncovered speech. 
The search engine speech debate fundamentally challenges this state of 
affairs because it shatters the tacit consensual understanding supporting it.  
The opinionated search engine argument explicitly denies the existence of 
the coverage filter.  It asserts that any communication within the definition 
of speech not included in the traditional exclusionary categories receives 
full protection.  Moreover, the argument invokes strong language from 
recent Supreme Court decisions purportedly supporting this position.  This 
raises the question of the existence of and the normative justification for the 
coverage filter.  Offhanded assertions based on a tacit consensus are no 
longer possible. 
The normative stakes of the question of coverage and of the broad speech 
theory behind the opinionated search engine argument are much higher than 
those of the immediate question of search ranking regulation.  In the 
absence of a coverage filter, when any speech, including implied 
observations of relevance, receives full First Amendment protection, large 
swaths of legal regulations may become subject to the demanding standard 
of First Amendment review.  Consider the following examples. 
For a handsome sum of money, Peter provides to competitors of his 
employer access to the employer’s valuable secret business information that 
 
 151. See Post, supra note 72, at 715; Schauer, supra note 20, at 1777–84. 
 152. See Schauer, supra note 20, at 1778 (observing that to discuss uncovered speech, 
“we need to leave our casebooks and the Supreme Court’s docket behind” and consider “not 
only the speech that the First Amendment noticeably ignores, but also the speech that it 
ignores more quietly”). 
 153. King v. Fed. Bureau of Prisons, 415 F.3d 634, 637 (7th Cir. 2005). 
 154. See Brocklesby v. United States, 767 F.2d 1288, 1294–95 (9th Cir. 1985) 
(classifying an erroneous airplane navigational chart as a defective product for purposes of 
defective product liability law); Saloomey v. Jeppesen & Co., 707 F.2d 671, 676–77 (2d Cir. 
1983) (same); see also Winter v. G.P. Putnam’s Sons, 938 F.2d 1033, 1035–36 (9th Cir. 
1991) (distinguishing a mushroom encyclopedia, which is “pure thought and expression,” 
from aircraft navigational charts, which are “highly technical tools”). 
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Peter keeps on his laptop.  Specifically, Peter writes a computer program 
that responds to the competitors’ search queries submitted to the program 
via the internet.  When a search term corresponds to a name of one of the 
employer’s customers, the software displays a wealth of secret information 
on the customer and its business relationship with the employer.  When 
sued under trade secret law,155 Peter asserts that the First Amendment bars 
the claim because whenever his software presents information to a user it 
also produces speech in the form of implied observations of relevance (i.e., 
that the displayed information is relevant for the user in relation to the 
search term). 
Paul, a minimarket owner, challenges as unconstitutional under the First 
Amendment a new state law that regulates the shelf placement of certain 
children’s food products, deemed unhealthy.156  The law prohibits 
placement of the products on shelves of highest consumer visibility, those 
below a certain height and those located in close proximity to the registers.  
Paul argues that the law violates his First Amendment rights because his 
choices about shelf placement, based on the visibility of the product, reflect 
implied observations of relevance to consumer preferences of those 
products, observations that are potentially understandable by consumers. 
Mary is sued for negligence after a computerized system she 
manufactures malfunctioned.  The system monitors the parameters of an 
industrial chemical process and provides notices divided into conspicuous 
“high priority warnings” and less conspicuous “standard notices,” where 
each category is displayed on a different screen.  Due to a bug, the software 
displayed the correct information about a critically dangerous value of one 
of the process’s parameters on the standard notices screen instead of the 
 
 155. The described facts give rise to a plausible infringement of trade secret claim against 
Peter, who disclosed information constituting a trade secret that he had acquired either under 
a duty of confidence or using improper means. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF UNFAIR 
COMPETITION § 40(b)(1)–(2) (1995); UNIF. TRADE SECRETS ACT § 1(2) (amended 1985), 14 
U.L.A. 537 (2005) (defining trade secret “misappropriation”). 
 156. See Jennifer L. Pomeranz, Extending the Fantasy in the Supermarket:  Where 
Unhealthy Food Promotions Meet Children and How the Government Can Intervene, 9 IND. 
HEALTH L. REV. 117, 168–75 (2012) (discussing regulation of food product placement on the 
basis of its nutritional value).  The scant case law on this issue is not very clear or consistent, 
but it is not hospitable to First Amendment claims in regard to product location.  In Lorillard 
Tobacco Co. v. Reilly, 533 U.S. 525 (2001), the Supreme Court assumed, for purposes of its 
analysis of a regulation that prohibited self-serving display of tobacco products, that 
manufacturers have a “cognizable speech interest” in a particular means of displaying their 
products. Id. at 569–70.  The Court found, however, that “Massachusetts seeks to regulate 
the placement of tobacco products for reasons unrelated to the communication of ideas” and 
upheld the regulation under a content-neutral test applied to such cases. Id.  Other cases 
expressed a more skeptical view on the very applicability of the First Amendment to similar 
situations. See Vill. of Hoffman Estates v. Flipside, Hoffman Estates, 455 U.S. 489, 496 
(1981) (rejecting a challenge to a regulation prohibiting the sale of drug paraphernalia in 
proximity to literature about illegal drugs because “insofar as any commercial speech interest 
is implicated . . . it is only the attenuated interest in displaying and marketing merchandise in 
the manner that the retailer desires”); Philip Morris USA, Inc. v. City of S.F., 345 F. App’x 
276, 277 (9th Cir. 2009) (finding that selling cigarettes in pharmacies is not a protected 
expressive activity because it “doesn’t involve conduct with a ‘significant expressive 
element.’” (quoting Arcara v. Cloud Books, Inc., 478 U.S. 697, 701–02 (1986))). 
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“high priority warnings” one.  As a result, the employee in charge of the 
process failed to notice the danger, stop the process in time, and prevent a 
destructive explosion.  Mary argues that the First Amendment bars a 
negligence claim because her software’s decisions on which screen to 
display the notice contain implied observations on the degree of priority of 
the message, potentially understandable by users. 
The point should be clear by now.  Implied observations of relevance are 
everywhere.  Almost anything that is done by people and their creations in 
the social and economic realms has a connotative meaning about relevance.  
Much of this meaning is at least as expressive as search ranking “opinions” 
of relevance.  Such communication satisfies the broad definition of 
expression and it does not necessarily fall within the categories of excluded 
speech.  The much-criticized distinction between speech and conduct is of 
little help in preventing the extension of First Amendment protection to 
substantial parts of this communication, found in every corner of social and 
economic life.  As many commentators observe, speech and conduct is 
often a hopelessly slippery distinction on which to build the boundaries of 
the First Amendment.157  The reason is twofold.  First, every human 
communication involves some conduct.  Second, and more importantly, 
many forms of human conduct involve some meaning, especially when we 
include connotative meaning.  The opinionated search engine argument and 
the extension of its logic ad absurdum demonstrate the latter point.  The 
meaning-bearing action in any of the three examples above does not clearly 
qualify as conduct any more than hyperlinked, ranked search results.158  
The conduct-speech distinction hardly seems the silver bullet that will allow 
us to treat search engine ranking as covered speech, but not the ubiquitous 
meaning attached to many other human actions. 
Nor is the tactic known as the O’Brien test, which courts sometimes use 
in hard speech/conduct cases, of much use here.159  Under this test, 
inaugurated in United States v. O’Brien,160 in cases where regulated 
conduct closely bundles together speech and nonspeech elements, the court 
subjects the regulation to a special constitutional standard designated for 
these cases.  This is an intermediary form of scrutiny—essentially the test 
applied today to any content-neutral regulation—midway between the 
exacting standard applied to content-based regulations and the lax rational-
 
 157. See, e.g., 1 SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 2:52; see also C. EDWIN BAKER, HUMAN 
LIBERTY AND FREEDOM OF SPEECH 70–73 (1989); FRANKLYN S. HAIMAN, SPEECH AND LAW IN 
A FREE SOCIETY 16–40 (1981). 
 158. Perhaps one could distinguish arranging products on the shelf from ranking search 
results on the ground that the former involves the physical action of placing the products.  
One would still be hard pressed to explain why the distinction between physically arranging 
products and structuring information provides a good normative reason to distinguish the 
cases. 
 159. United States v. O’Brien, 391 U.S. 367 (1968); see FARBER, supra note 75, at 40 
(discussing how the O’Brien test explains the fading away of the importance of the speech-
conduct distinction by shifting the focus from this distinction to the question of content 
neutrality). 
 160. 391 U.S. at 367. 
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basis standard applied to nonspeech regulation.161  The trouble with the 
O’Brien escape route in our context is that one of the basic elements of the 
test requires that the regulation be content neutral, meaning that it must not 
be based on the specific expressive content of the conduct.162  In the case of 
search results, as well as in the myriad of analogous cases, this distinction is 
impossible.  Action and connotative meaning are too closely bundled.  
Change the action and you necessarily change the meaning.  Target a 
specific conduct and you necessarily target a specific meaning embedded in 
it.163  Prohibiting a specific search ranking or a specific arrangement of 
products on the shelf necessarily targets specific connotative meaning about 
relevance associated with these actions.  Consequently, O’Brien is of no 
help in stemming the flood of First Amendment scrutiny resulting from the 
opinionated search engine argument. 
At this point, some readers may wonder what is wrong with extending 
the First Amendment to all meanings connoted by a vast universe of 
pervasive human actions.  This is the point where the dark shadow of First 
Amendment Lochnerism comes into the picture.  The Lochner era at the 
dawn of the twentieth century, named after Lochner v. New York,164 is 
remembered as a period of aggressive attack by the courts on the ability of 
government to regulate economic and social life grounded in the 
substantive Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.165  Some 
commentators, who identified a broad trend in recent decades of a turn by 
big business to the First Amendment in order to frustrate various 
governmental regulations, have dubbed this trend “First Amendment 
Lochnerism.”166  This turn to the First Amendment, perhaps reminiscent of 
the role played by the Fourteenth Amendment during the Lochner era, is 
understandable.  In post–New Deal constitutional jurisprudence, the First 
Amendment is one of the most significant enclaves of the Court’s 
willingness to aggressively scrutinize and considerably limit government 
 
 161. Under this test, the regulation will be upheld “if it furthers an important or 
substantial governmental interest; if the governmental interest is unrelated to the suppression 
of free expression; and if the incidental restriction on alleged First Amendment freedoms is 
no greater than is essential to the furtherance of that interest.” Id. at 377. 
 162. See Clark v. Cmty. for Creative Non-Violence, 468 U.S. 288, 293 (1984) (noting 
that to pass constitutional muster the regulation must be “justified without reference to the 
content of the regulated speech”). 
 163. See infra text accompanying notes 244–47. 
 164. 108 U.S. 45 (1905). 
 165. See generally PAUL KENS, LOCHNER V. NEW YORK:  ECONOMIC REGULATION ON TRIAL 
154–76 (1998) (discussing the Lochner era); Jamal Greene, The Anticanon, 125 HARV. L. 
REV. 379, 417–22 (2011) (discussing the criticism of Lochner in mainstream American legal 
thought and revisionist efforts). 
 166. See generally Kenneth D. Katkin, Symposium Introduction, First Amendment 
Lochnerism?  Emerging Constitutional Limitations on Government Regulation of Non-
speech Economic Activity, 33 N. KY. L. REV. 365 (2006); Jedediah Purdy, The Roberts Court 
v. America:  How the Roberts Supreme Court Is Using the First Amendment To Craft a 
Radical, Free-Market Jurisprudence, 23 DEMOCRACY:  J. IDEAS 46, 52 (2012), available at 
http://www.democracyjournal.org/pdf/23/the_roberts_court_v_america.pdf (describing 
recent Supreme Court First Amendment jurisprudence as “neo-Lochner-ism”). 
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regulatory action.167  A more recent development is the rise of the 
information economy in which much business activity is concentrated 
around informational resources or streams—exactly the kind of subject 
matter that could be potentially characterized as “speech.”  Together, these 
two features make the First Amendment a very rich vein to be mined by 
business actors seeking refuge from regulation.  Needless to say, positive 
explanations do not necessarily make a normative justification. 
The opinionated search engine argument takes this process to a new 
level.  It raises the specter of a true First Amendment Lochnerism:  a 
jurisprudence in which the First Amendment, like the Fourteenth 
Amendment in the Lochner era, subjects almost any economic and social 
regulation to exacting constitutional scrutiny and throws its validity into 
doubt.168  Such a development would fundamentally change the balance of 
post–New Deal jurisprudence based on the lax test of rational basis 
accompanied by limited enclaves of higher-standard scrutiny, including the 
limited area of application of the First Amendment.169 
It is highly doubtful that the recent Supreme Court opinions containing 
broad language on the limited nature of First Amendment exceptions 
contemplated this sort of opening of the floodgates or considered its 
monumental implications.  A much more plausible reading of these 
opinions is to understand their ruling as limited to the first filter, that of 
exclusionary categories, and as saying nothing about the second one, that of 
coverage.  Under this reading, when the Supreme Court said in Brown v. 
Entertainment Merchants Ass’n that “new categories of unprotected speech 
may not be added to the list” of traditional categories of excluded speech, it 
refused to add any content-based excluded categories or to read broadly the 
existing ones.170  It simply did not address, however, the different issue of 
coverage.  It would be strange if the Court intended to eliminate the 
longstanding, if somewhat obscure, coverage filter without a word of 
reasoning on the subject and without a hint of considering the far-reaching 
effect of such a move on the structure of constitutional review. 
 
 167. MORTON J. HORWITZ, THE WARREN COURT AND THE PURSUIT OF JUSTICE 58, 67 
(1998) (describing the split in the post–New Deal Supreme Court over the question of 
increased protection to First Amendment freedoms and the ultimate triumph of the view 
supporting this position). 
 168. See Pasquale, supra note 43, at 118 (arguing that a broad application of the First 
Amendment to search engines’ speech “threatens to ‘Lochnerize’ the field”); Wu, supra note 
24, at 1508 (“At some point a broad theory of speech would encounter the anticanonical 
influence of Lochner v. New York.”). 
 169. See United States v. Carolene Prods. Co., 304 U.S. 144, 152 & n.4 (1938) (observing 
that “regulatory legislation affecting ordinary commercial transactions is not to be 
pronounced unconstitutional unless in the light of the facts made known or generally 
assumed it is of such a character as to preclude the assumption that it rests upon some 
rational basis”—subject to “narrower scope for operation of the presumption of 
constitutionality” in certain cases); see also JOHN HART ELY, DEMOCRACY AND DISTRUST:  A 
THEORY OF JUDICIAL REVIEW 76 (1980) (developing a theory that explains the structure of 
modern constitutional law, as expressed in Carolene Products, on the basis of the Court’s 
function of making sure that “the channels of political participation and communication are 
kept open”). 
 170. Brown v. Entm’t Merchs. Ass’n, 131 S. Ct. 2729, 2734 (2011). 
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Concluding that the Supreme Court did not eliminate the coverage filter 
from First Amendment jurisprudence still leaves open the hard questions 
triggered by the opinionated search engine argument.  What is the criterion 
for deciding whether the First Amendment covers particular speech, and 
how does it apply to search ranking’s implied observations of relevance? 
C.  Normative Framework:  Freedom-of-Speech-
Significant Social Practices 
One may scour the case law in vain for a clear test or even guidance on 
the question of First Amendment coverage.  In the absence of either 
doctrinal guidance or a tacit consensus, answers must be sought in 
normative analysis.  Normative theories of freedom of speech are somewhat 
of an embarrassment.  Commentators point out that no normative theory 
can coherently account for First Amendment jurisprudence in its entirety,171 
and courts appear almost gleeful to ignore such theories.172  Despite this 
disdain, however, the only coherent way of formulating guidance on 
applying the coverage filter is through normative analysis.173 
There are three dominant normative theories of freedom of speech.  
Democratic governance theory focuses on the instrumental value of speech 
in facilitating the deliberative process essential for democratic politics.174  
The pursuit of truth theory emphasizes the importance of an open and free 
marketplace of ideas in furthering the exploration of truth.175  Finally, 
autonomy theory regards speech as a fundamental part of individual liberty 
and as a central aspect of human self-realization.176  The trouble, as 
Frederick Schauer explains, is that none of these three theories is able to 
explain the entire pattern of exclusion and inclusion of First Amendment 
 
 171. THOMAS I. EMERSON, TOWARD A GENERAL THEORY OF THE FIRST AMENDMENT, at vii 
(1966) (“[N]o really adequate or comprehensive theory of the First Amendment has been 
enunciated, much less agreed upon.”); see Robert Post, Reconciling Theory and Doctrine in 
First Amendment Jurisprudence, 88 CALIF. L. REV. 2353, 2372 (2000) (arguing that the 
Supreme Court has not consistently adopted any one theory of the First Amendment); Steven 
Shiffrin, Dissent, Democratic Participation and First Amendment Methodology, 97 VA. L. 
REV. 559, 560 (2011) (“No theory has dominated.”). 
 172. FARBER, supra note 75, at 6 (noting that single value theories of First Amendment 
law “were almost entirely ignored by the courts”). 
 173. See Post, supra note 72, at 716. 
 174. See generally ALEXANDER MEIKLEJOHN, FREE SPEECH AND ITS RELATION TO SELF-
GOVERNMENT (1948); ROBERT C. POST, CONSTITUTIONAL DOMAINS:  DEMOCRACY, 
COMMUNITY, MANAGEMENT 119–78 (1995); James Weinstein, Participatory Democracy As 
the Central Value of American Free Speech Doctrine, 97 VA. L. REV. 491 (2011). 
 175. The metaphor of the marketplace of ideas is usually traced back to Justice Holmes’s 
dissent in Abrams v. United States, 250 U.S. 616, 630 (1919) (Holmes, J., dissenting).  On 
the pursuit of truth theory, see SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 6, and William P. Marshall, In 
Defense of the Search for Truth As a First Amendment Justification, 30 GA. L. REV. 1 
(1995). 
 176. See generally BAKER, supra note 157, at 194–224; SCHAUER, supra note 149, at 68–
70; Thomas E. Emerson, Toward a General Theory of the First Amendment, 72 YALE L.J. 
877 (1963); Martin H. Redish, The Value of Free Speech, 130 U. PA. L. REV. 591 (1982). 
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coverage.177  Schauer’s response seems to be giving up altogether on 
normative explanations of coverage and switching to a positive account 
instead.178 
Robert Post offers a way out of this apparent dead end.  The normative 
underpinnings of coverage rules, Post explains, cannot be understood by 
reference to abstract and broad categories of speech detached from specific 
social context.179  Flag burning, computer code, or sentences written on 
paper, do not have a general and constant normative significance.  Their 
normative significance only arises within the rich details of the specific 
social practices in which they are embedded.180  The same written sentence 
carries a different normative weight when produced as part of a client’s sale 
order to a broker and when displayed on a street protest sign.  Computer 
code may have little normative significance related to freedom of speech 
when merely fed to a computer that executes its instructions compared to 
when it is published in a computer science journal or blog.  In short, speech 
and its regulation can only be normatively evaluated in the context of the 
specific social practices in which the speech is embedded.  It follows that 
the coverage filter should not be understood as applying to abstract 
categories of speech.  Exclusion from the coverage of the First Amendment 
is based not on an abstract classification of the speech but on a normative 
judgment that a specific speech practice targeted by a regulation at issue is 
not relevant for First Amendment values.181  This approach provides a 
normative criterion for coverage:  a particular regulation targeting a specific 
practice is outside the coverage of the First Amendment when the speech 
practice, understood in light of the specifics of the social interactions 
involved, has little or no significance for freedom of speech values. 
Grounding First Amendment coverage in concrete social practices 
explains why no single normative theory is successful in explaining its 
pattern.  Rather than embodying a single monolithic value, various speech 
practices implicate different values.182  Some practices may embody mainly 
the value of democratic governance; others the value of truth seeking; and 
yet others a mix of several free speech values.  Some social practices, 
although involving speech in the technical sense, do not significantly 
involve any relevant free speech value.  It follows, then, that the First 
Amendment covers a particular regulation when the specific social practice 
it adversely affects is more than trivially relevant for any plausible free 
speech value.  Thus, for example, it seems that, prima facie, the prisoner’s 
sale instructions to his broker fail the coverage test.  While the prisoner’s 
expression is technically speech (which may be covered in other social 
 
 177. Schauer, supra note 20, at 1785 (“[N]one of the existing normative accounts appears 
to explain descriptively much of, let alone most of, the First Amendment’s existing 
inclusions and exclusions.”). 
 178. Id. at 1788–1807. 
 179. Post, supra note 22, at 1273 (“The unit of First Amendment analysis . . . ought not to 
be speech, but rather particular forms of social structure.”). 
 180. Id. at 1255. 
 181. Id.; see also Post, supra note 72, at 716. 
 182. Post, supra note 22, at 1271–72. 
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contexts), the specific social practice involved seems of little relevance to 
any of the dominant three normative theories of freedom of speech, or, 
indeed, to any other alternative theory. 
D.  The Social Practice of Search Ranking 
How does this normative framework apply to search ranking?  
Observations on the relative relevance of websites for users’ specific 
preferences are not speech excluded from First Amendment coverage in the 
abstract.  Rather, the specific speech practices of search engines affected by 
the kind of regulations considered in this Article must be evaluated.  An 
analysis based on this proper focus yields a clear conclusion:  the specific 
speech practices of connotative observations of relevance embodied in 
search results are hardly of normative relevance from the perspective of any 
of the common normative theories of freedom of speech. 
Consider first the search for truth theory.  In the abstract, search rankings 
contain propositions whose veracity could be affirmed or refuted.183  
Google may be right or wrong in observing that I prioritize a group of 
websites in a certain way in relation to a particular search term.184  The 
reason why search rankings are of little normative significance is not the 
content of the speech, but rather the nature of the speech practices involved.  
The social practice through which the speech is carried out has nothing to 
do with conventional social practices and procedures associated with the 
investigation of truth as a valuable social enterprise.  As Post puts it, 
“Truth-seeking is not merely a matter of sentences and propositions; it also 
involves habits of mind, priorities of reason, intersubjective orientations, 
and attitudes that, when taken together, make up what we recognize to be 
rational exchange or collective search for knowledge.”185  We can refer to 
these conventional practices as “inquisitorial practices,” namely social 
speech practices that have a reasonable, substantial connection to the 
examination, validation, or refutation of the truth value of propositions.  
Google publishing an article or a blog post in which it makes certain claims 
about the preferences of certain groups of users or even disseminating a 
compendium of raw information about the subject could plausibly be seen 
as inquisitorial speech practices.  But the inquisitorial aspect of propositions 
implied in search rankings is too incidental and trivial to have any 
significant normative value.  In this respect, the scenario is analogous to the 
prisoner instructing his broker to sell stock.186  The speech in this example 
 
 183. See Grimmelmann, supra note 12, at 916 (arguing that search results are “descriptive 
opinions about relevance”). 
 184. Arguably, search rankings embody another category of propositions with a truth 
value:  propositions about what the search engine thinks the user’s priorities are.  Taking 
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triviality.  Almost any social action involves a self-referential, implied proposition about the 
beliefs and dispositions of the actor.  Arguing that any such action should be protected by the 
First Amendment because of its value for the search for truth seems to justify too much and 
therefore nothing. 
 185. Post, supra note 22, at 1272. 
 186. See supra text accompanying notes 145–46. 
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contains implied propositions having a truth value, such as observations 
about the prisoner’s preferences and possibly even his views about the 
expected performance of certain stock. An attempt by the prisoner to 
publish an essay on the subject, and perhaps even a pamphlet with 
recommendations to investors, would be an inquisitorial practice relevant 
for the value of truth seeking, but the broker instruction is not.  In this case, 
as in the case of search ranking, the connection to conventional social 
practices reasonably related to the search of truth is too remote and 
precarious to be of normative significance. 
A similar analysis applies to the application of democratic governance 
theory.  In the proper context arguments, views and even raw information 
about preferences of users can be part of a deliberative democratic process.  
But the specific social practice of search ranking is not directly part of 
social practices relevant for democratic self-governance.  Democratic 
governance is not “merely a matter of talking,”187 but involves a specific set 
of social interactions in which citizens engage each other through dialogical 
speech.  A dialogical practice is a specific form of interaction by which 
humans govern themselves collectively through argumentation, persuasion, 
deliberation, and debate.188  The speaker and user interaction in regard to 
search ranking is not dialogical or deliberative.  No one reads search results 
to be informed of Google’s views of users’ preferences.  More importantly, 
users do not potentially interact with search ranking dialogically.  One may 
find different rankings more or less useful for her purposes.  But one is not 
persuaded or unconvinced by a search ranking.  One does not consider the 
arguments of search rankings, examine her opinions against them, or write a 
critique of them.  The heart of the matter is, again, the nature of the social 
practice involved.  A map could be speech that is normatively significant 
for democratic values when embedded in a relevant social practice, such as 
a pamphlet or a civic group’s emblem.  The very same map carries no 
normative significance when sold and used as a navigational aid.189  The 
social practice of observations of relevance contained in search results is 
much like the latter.  It is not sufficiently connected to any deliberative or 
dialogical speech practice that could be plausibly associated with the 
democratic process, even broadly construed. 
Individual autonomy is probably where the normative insignificance of 
the social practice of search ranking is most obvious.  Several threshold 
issues cast serious doubt on the relevance of this normative outlook for 
search ranking.  Consider first the nature of the postulated speaker:  a 
business corporation engaged in a commercial activity.  Whose individual 
autonomy is promoted by the speech imputed to Google or Microsoft?  The 
connection between the speech embodied in search ranking and the 
autonomy interest of any of the multitude of actual individuals represented 
 
 187. Post, supra note 22, at 1272. 
 188. Id. at 1254; see also Post, supra note 72, at 720. 
 189. See Post, supra note 22, at 1254 (explaining that navigation charts do not receive 
First Amendment protection because we interpret them as “speaking monologically to their 
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by the corporate personality fiction is far from clear.190  It has long been 
settled that the First Amendment protects business corporations,191 but to 
make a specific normative argument for the extension of free speech 
protection explicitly based on the supposed personal autonomy interest of a 
business corporation still seems like a stretch. 
Consider next the identity of the speaker in the case of search ranking, its 
corporate status aside.  Who exactly is the “author” of the implied 
observations of relevance embodied in search ranking?  Proponents of 
search engine speech seem to tacitly rely on a mechanical agency theory.  
Specific search rankings are produced by a computer program incorporating 
a complex algorithm.  The output of the algorithm may be imputed to its 
human creators, whose own actions may be imputed, in turn, to their 
corporate employer.  In this construct, the algorithm is a tool, much like a 
painter’s brush or a writer’s word processor.  The speaker is the human 
agent who designed and used the tool to produce a certain result.192  The 
difficulty with search ranking, in the age of personal search, is that the 
specific result or speech is produced through an interaction between the 
carefully designed tool (the algorithm) and a rich set of personal user data 
that is not produced or controlled by the designer of the tool.193  The 
substantial part that data plays in shaping the final result undermines the 
alleged unbroken connection between the designer of the tool and the 
outcome it claims as an expression of its personal autonomy.  Consider the 
analogy of an intricate musical instrument whose tubes and valves are 
carefully designed by its creator to respond to air temperature and 
movement, thereby producing predetermined sounds.  After being placed in 
the open, the instrument reacts to changing random natural conditions and 
produces a complex tune.  Can the designer of the instrument be plausibly 
seen as the author of the tune?  More importantly, should the tune, as 
opposed to the design of the instrument, be seen as an expression of the 
designer’s autonomy?  The answer to these questions is not self-evident. 
Whatever the merit of those threshold doubts, the main reason why 
search rankings carry no normative weight from the perspective of 
individual autonomy is much the same as in the case of the other theories.  
Even bracketing the corporate status of the speaker and its doubtful claim 
for authorship, the specific speech practice involved is of little relevance to 
the values of individual autonomy and self-realization.  The expression 
implicit in search results hardly seems an act of individual self-realization 
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or an assertion of the speaker’s identity.  The expression is merely a side 
effect, an incident of a functional apparatus whose main purpose is to 
promote the search engine’s commercial interest by providing a useful 
service for users.194  Again, the crux of the matter is not the abstract content 
of the speech, but the specifics of the social practice in which it is 
embedded. 
Expression consisting of ranking content, even when it is of service to 
users, could be germane for the speaker’s autonomy and identity.  Consider, 
for example, a ranked list of website recommendations on a particular topic, 
created by a human author that includes elaborate evaluation and personal 
impressions of each website.  In this example, the speech strongly connects 
to the speaker’s affirmation of self-identity and choice, as well as the 
realization of her rational faculties through expression.  There is a 
continuum of speech practices leading from such contexts that strongly 
implicate autonomy values to others where the connection between speech 
and affirmation of individual freedom and personality is weaker.  Search 
ranking is located close to the extreme end of this continuum, where any 
such connection is negligible at best. 
To be sure, in some abstract sense, search rankings involve autonomy.  
They embody someone’s choices (mediated through algorithm and data) on 
what to include and how to rank websites in response to users’ queries.  But 
in this broad and loose sense, any volitional human activity involves 
autonomy.  What matters for free speech autonomy theory is not autonomy 
in the abstract, but rather expressive autonomy.  Autonomy as a normative 
ground for freedom of speech identifies speech as a unique realm where 
there is a particularly strong and close connection between individual 
subjective choices or identities and their manifestation in the world.195  This 
specific connection between expression, self-identity, and self-realization 
justifies special protection from governmental intervention, beyond that 
given on general autonomy grounds.196  Specific social practices where 
speech does not hold this intimate connection to individual identity and 
subjectivity carry no normative significance from the point of view of the 
autonomy framework that justifies special protection to speech on account 
of its unique connection to individual self-realization. 
Recall that it is not the general content of the speech that makes it 
normatively insignificant.197  Nor does the mere fact that it was produced 
with the aid of a computer algorithm render the speech normatively 
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insignificant.  Rather, the free speech analysis is driven by the full specific 
context of the social practice in which the relevant speech is embedded.  
When analyzed from this perspective, implied observations of relevance 
embodied in a search engine ranking have no normative significance from 
the point of view of each of the three dominant normative theories of 
freedom of speech.  Someone is yet to suggest an alternative normative 
ground explaining why the First Amendment should cover search rankings 
as understood in the context of their relevant social practices. 
E.  Objections 
There are several possible objections to the conclusion that the speech 
embodied in search engine ranking is not covered by the First Amendment 
because it involves no normatively significant speech practices.  The first 
objection is that the First Amendment applies to any regulation that targets 
a specific viewpoint, irrespective of the presence of any protected speech.  
The second objection is that typically users’ experience with search results 
is interactive or even conversational, and that as a result the opinions 
embodied in search ranking are part of a dialogical speech practice.  The 
third and last objection is that search ranking, even if not itself a 
normatively significant speech practice, has instrumental effects on other 
social practices that are highly relevant for freedom of speech values.  Each 
of these ostensibly weighty objections dissolves on closer examination. 
1.  Viewpoint Discrimination 
A possible objection to the foregoing analysis is that it is unduly focused 
on the character of search engine speech.  The conclusion that a search 
ranking is uncovered speech is based on the premise that the speech 
practices of ranking do not realize free speech values.  First Amendment 
coverage is not limited, however, to cases involving speech recognized as 
such under the broad doctrinal definition.  In some cases, the First 
Amendment may apply even when the relevant speech falls within one of 
the traditional categories of excluded speech or, according to at least one 
commentator, even when no speech at all is present.198  Thus, in R.A.V. v. 
City of St. Paul,199 the Supreme Court invalidated an ordinance that 
criminalized hate speech by punishing communicative behavior “which one 
knows or has reasonable grounds to know arouses anger, alarm or 
resentment in others on the basis of race, color, creed, religion or 
gender.”200  The Court reached this conclusion despite the fact that the 
ordinance was restricted to “fighting words”—one of the traditional 
categories of excluded speech.201  The Court reasoned that the regulation 
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targeted only hate speech embodying a particular viewpoint, thereby 
violating the principle that “government may not regulate use based on 
hostility—or favoritism—towards the underlying message expressed.”202  
Scholars have described this principle as a general ban on governmental 
viewpoint discrimination or content-based censorial motivation.203  Under 
this principle, the First Amendment is triggered whenever the government 
attempts to suppress a specific viewpoint, whether or not the regulated act is 
recognized as nonexcluded speech for purposes of the First Amendment.204  
Applying this principle, one could argue that the regulation of search 
ranking necessarily targets specific viewpoints (i.e., certain implied 
observations of relevance) on the basis of their content, and therefore 
triggers the First Amendment, irrespective of the presence of covered 
speech. 
This objection falls flat because coverage grounded in the regulation’s 
targeting of a specific viewpoint is subject to the same analysis as coverage 
based on the presence of speech.  Just as the existence of speech is not a 
sufficient condition for triggering the First Amendment, so too is the 
existence of a governmental purpose of targeting specific content.  The 
same logic applies to both alternatives.  Applying the First Amendment to 
any regulation that could be described in the abstract as targeting specific 
content would be inconsistent with either existing doctrine or any normative 
justification of freedom of speech.  Specific content or even viewpoint is 
implicit in countless social activities.  When trade secrets law prohibits the 
disclosure of certain information (that which is secret and of value to its 
owner), but not other information, it targets specific content.205  When 
criminal law prohibits the sale of certain controlled substances, it targets 
specific implied representations by sellers on relevance for buyers’ 
preferences on the basis of point of view.  If it covered any regulation that 
could be formally described as targeting specific viewpoints, the First 
Amendment would be omnipresent.  Fortunately, that is not the case.  Just 
like the mere existence of communicated meaning (i.e., speech), the formal 
feature of a regulation as targeting specific content by itself is an 
insufficient condition for triggering the First Amendment.  The R.A.V. 
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majority opinion expressed this principle by limiting its holding to cases 
when a “realistic possibility that official suppression of ideas is afoot.”206 
The need to differentiate between content-based regulations covered by 
the First Amendment and those that are not leads back to the analysis 
offered above.207  The only currently available satisfactory way of drawing 
such a distinction is assessing whether a formally content-based regulation 
of a specific social practice interferes with the realization of First 
Amendment values.  For the reasons already explained, search ranking is 
not a social practice that directly realizes First Amendment values.208  
Switching the ground from describing ranking as speech to presenting it as 
an activity whose regulation targets a specific viewpoint does not change 
the outcome of the analysis.  The burden remains on search engine speech 
proponents to show how the regulatory intervention with this social practice 
is relevant for any normative account of free speech. 
2.  Search As a Dialogical Speech Practice 
One may further object that the speech practices associated with search 
ranking are, in fact, dialogical.  Some searches are “navigational” in 
nature.209  In those cases, the user is focused on a well-defined, 
predetermined object for her search (say, locating the office number of a 
colleague) and uses the search engine in a straightforward, mechanical way 
to achieve this goal.  These cases are the equivalent of looking for 
someone’s phone number in a telephone directory.  Other searches, 
however, are much more open ended, and the interaction with the search 
engine could be described as conversational.  I may start my search with a 
general key term, be presented by the search engine with prioritized results 
or alternative search terms, and revise my search term in response to this 
information.  This process may be reiterated numerous times.  Within the 
course of this interactive process, the user may refine or change not just his 
original search terms but also the goals of the search and perhaps even his 
views or preferences.  One may start the search process looking for 
information on “global warming,” having just a vague, general idea of a 
desire for more information on the subject, and end up looking for and 
accessing the recruitment website of a specific activism group in this area.  
Is not interaction of this sort a dialogical practice? 
Furthermore, the effects of such conversational interactions with search 
engines may be shaped in systematic ways.210  For example, alternative 
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designs of the search algorithm may steer different shares of users, who 
started their search with the term “global warming,” toward very different 
kinds of websites within this broad field.  These systematic effects may be 
“political” in the sense of channeling users toward exposure or nonexposure 
to particular kinds of information with different impacts on views and 
actions.211  Perhaps these systematic effects are even intentional, in the 
sense that the algorithm’s designers are deliberately structuring it to channel 
users into certain substantively preferred patterns.  Search engines have 
understandably avoided describing themselves as embedding their own 
substantive preferences in their algorithm.  When Google abandoned its 
self-cultivated public image as a neutral tool for objectively representing 
information, it carefully replaced it with the concept of search ranking as 
subjective opinions on relevance for users’ preferences, not with the notion 
of search ranking as a tool for instilling in users the search engine’s own 
substantive preferences.212  Fears of search engines purposefully designing 
the interactive search process to serve their own substantive preferences is 
one of the main motivations of proponents of search engine regulation.213  
Search engines, therefore, have no interest in portraying themselves in this 
fashion in public debate.  In the context of free speech, however, the idea of 
the search process as promoting the search engine’s own substantive agenda 
may play a different role. If much of the interaction of users with search 
results is not only conversational but also informed by the search engine’s 
own substantive views or preferences, isn’t this an obvious case of a 
dialogical social practice?  And, if search is a dialogical social practice, then 
search ranking is part of a speech practice that embodies free speech values 
and must be covered by the First Amendment. 
This objection fails because, while search is often interactive, adaptive, 
and perhaps even informed by the search engine’s substantive agenda, it is 
not dialogical in the sense relevant for freedom of speech values.  To 
understand the difference, consider the following hypothetical analogy.  
Imagine that Captain Jean-Luc Picard (from Star Trek) asks the replicator (a 
machine capable of creating physical objects) for a “cake.”214  Fifteen 
samples of cakes materialize with names and descriptions.  After looking at 
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the cakes, Picard says, “Chocolate cake.”  Ten different varieties of 
chocolate cake appear.  The process goes through several additional 
iterations.  By the end of the process, Picard ends up with a specific brand 
of chocolate cake, having not just refined his choice but also adjusted his 
views and preferences about cakes.  The process described is interactive and 
adaptive, but it is not dialogical.  A dialogue, for purposes of democratic 
free speech theory, means a group of conventional speech practices through 
which people collectively govern themselves involving debate, 
argumentation, persuasion, articulation and examination of views, or similar 
activities.215  Shaping the views of others through an interactive process of 
manipulation, not involving any of these conventional practices or others 
similar to them, is not dialogical and is not given a privileged status by 
democratic self-governance theory. 
This conclusion will remain unchanged even if the interactive process is 
designed with specific substantive goals or an agenda in mind.  The fact 
that the builder of the replicator purposefully designed the machine’s 
responses to steer users toward particular brands of cakes, and away from 
others, does not make the interaction with the replicator dialogical, as long 
as the relevant speech practices are not part of it.  Nor does it matter if the 
means through which the interactive process unfolds constitute speech in 
the technical sense.  Assume that, instead of sample cakes, the replicator in 
our example responds to each command by replicating a list of written 
instructions directing the user to the physical location in the galley of 
Picard’s starship, the Enterprise, where the cake samples are located.  The 
technical means through which the interactive process is carried out are 
now speech, but the speech practices are still not dialogical because they 
involve none of the conventional practices relevant for democratic theory. 
The logic of the hypothetical example applies with equal force to search 
practices.  No doubt, the search process often uses speech in interactive and 
adaptive ways.  The process may even shape the preferences and views of 
users.  It is even possible that, in some cases, these shaping effects are 
attributable to substantive preferences of the designer embedded in the 
search algorithm’s design.  All of this, however, does not transform search 
into a dialogical practice.  As long as the conventional deliberative practices 
of collective self-governance through dialogue relevant for democratic 
theory are absent, search remains a nondialogical social practice outside the 
coverage of the First Amendment. 
3.  Instrumental Value 
One final objection is that, although the observations of relevance in 
ranking may not themselves be normatively significant practices, they 
facilitate other practices that are.  Search engine ranking—and potential 
regulative constraints—greatly influence the ability of many speakers to 
speak effectively and of many users to access speech and interact with it as 
part of social practices that are at the heart of each of the three normative 
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theories of freedom of speech.  Undoubtedly, a regulation that makes it 
significantly harder for a user to locate a suitable online forum for debating 
the merits of healthcare reform or frustrates the ability of a website owner 
to get effective exposure of her theory of global warming adversely affects 
social practices that realize free speech values.  The effect of search engine 
regulation on websites’ and users’ speech practices, attributable to the 
instrumental value of search engines for these practices, places such 
regulation squarely within the purview of the First Amendment. 
While valid, this argument has no effect on the conclusion that search 
ranking as such is not within the coverage of the First Amendment.  The 
crucial point is that the relevant speech practices and the focus of the legal 
analysis are not the observations embedded in search ranking, but rather the 
speech interests of websites and users that may be instrumentally affected 
by ranking practices.  Search ranking regulations may be covered by the 
First Amendment in the same way that the regulation of movie projectors, 
paper, or TV sets may be.  All of these practices are covered to the extent 
they instrumentally affect other speech practices that are normatively 
significant.216  Regulation of the technical design of TV sets may be 
covered not because the design is speech or because the regulation is 
content based in regard to the design, but rather because it may affect 
normatively relevant speech practices facilitated by TV sets.  The same 
applies to search ranking.  This logic leads back, of course, to First 
Amendment review of search-ranking regulation driven by the interests of 
search engine constituencies explained above.217 
Whether search ranking is covered as such, or only because of its 
instrumental value for other free-speech-significant practices, is of great 
importance.  Some regulations may clearly adversely affect search engine 
constituencies’ speech practices.  A law that prohibits search engines from 
listing websites identified as including material about communism, 
scientology, or sexuality adversely affects normatively significant speech 
practices of users and website owners.  Moreover, such a law regulates in a 
way that is viewpoint based vis-à-vis these practices.  Other regulations 
may adversely affect such normatively significant speech practices despite 
being content neutral in regard to them.  The likely destructive effect that a 
regulation that orders the randomization of search results would have on the 
efficacy of a search probably places the regulation in this category.218  The 
same may be true of a regulation that orders complete transparency of the 
search algorithm because such transparency is likely to empower gaming of 
the search process and lead to its corruption.219  But other regulations fare 
much better when analyzed from the perspective of the speech practices of 
the search engine’s constituencies.  Consider a legal norm that prohibits a 
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search engine from downgrading the ranking of a website because it does 
not participate in a commercial program run by the search engine, such as 
Google’s AdSense program.220  Seen as a regulation of Google’s speech 
embodied in search ranking, this is a content-based regulation that has little 
chance of surviving scrutiny.  Analyzed from the perspective of search 
engine constituencies’ speech practices, however, the regulation is content 
neutral and is very likely to be found valid.  It makes all the difference 
whether a regulation is scrutinized as an abridgment of search ranking 
speech or because of its instrumental effect on the speech of search engine 
constituencies. 
III.  SPEECH AND FUNCTION 
To recap the argument so far:  The existence of speech is not a sufficient 
condition for triggering First Amendment scrutiny.  To be covered by the 
First Amendment, the regulated specific speech practice has to be more than 
trivially related to free speech values.  And, the social practice of search 
ranking does not satisfy this condition and therefore it is not covered.   
The sort of freewheeling normative analysis on which this conclusion is 
based may make some uneasy if offered as a model for courts’ handling of 
novel claims for First Amendment protection of the kind presented by 
search engine speech.  Are judges to engage on an ad hoc basis in an open-
ended policy evaluation of the normative significance of the speech 
practices involved?  To some extent, this is exactly what judges are already 
implicitly doing whenever they assume that the First Amendment does not 
cover a specific speech practice.  Still, the kind of explicit normative 
analysis necessitated by the dispute over search ranking and other machine-
generated speech may seem to some to be too unconstrained.  As the 
Supreme Court recently reiterated, First Amendment jurisprudence is 
strongly averse to grant either government, or the courts, a plenary power to 
deny First Amendment protection to speech on the basis of their evaluation 
of its social value.221  Examining whether a specific speech practice has 
sufficient connection to any free speech values is not the same as evaluating 
the social value of speech on the basis of its content.  Yet, some may see 
unlimited discretion to engage in the former as treading too close to the 
latter.  But if the coverage filter is to exist at all, courts need some method 
for deciding controversial cases such as the one presented by the search 
engine speech argument. 
A partial remedy for this dilemma is to adopt a strategy, typical of First 
Amendment jurisprudence, known as the categorical approach.222  Rather 
 
 220. Google’s AdSense is an advertising model in which websites display targeted 
advertisements administered by Google and share the revenue with it. See AdSense, GOOGLE, 
https://www.google.com/adsense (last visited Feb. 24, 2014). 
 221. See United States v. Stevens, 559 U.S. 460, 470 (2010) (describing as “startling and 
dangerous” a free-floating test for First Amendment coverage based on balancing the value 
of the speech against its social cost). 
 222. See generally SCHAUER, supra note 149; Wu, supra note 24, at 1509 (observing that 
the categorical approach is “easier to criticize than improve upon”).  For a critical account of 
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than engaging in a completely ad hoc inquiry into the merits of every 
speech practice relevant for each case, courts can apply general proxy 
categories of uncovered speech practices.  One such category, highly 
relevant for search engine speech and for cases of machine-generated 
speech more broadly, is that of functional speech practices. 
A.  The Latent Functionality Doctrine 
Tim Wu has recently identified a de facto functionality doctrine in First 
Amendment law.223  He also described this doctrine as “mysterious.”224  
This is an understatement.  In its current state, functionality is hardly a 
doctrine at all.  At most it is a latent, elusive principle whose status is akin 
to the privacy principle at the time when it was “discovered” by Warren and 
Brandeis as underlying various common law rules.225  Nevertheless, the 
principle is there.  Articulating and refining it as an explicit legal doctrine 
could be the key for handling the hard coverage decisions that courts are 
likely to face in the age of machine speech. 
The gist of the proposed functionality principle is that the First 
Amendment does not cover a particular speech practice if its predominant 
purpose and nature focus on some functional end, and any nonfunctional 
aspects of the speech practice in the relevant context are not more than 
trivial.  This category does not encompass all uncovered speech.  It is a 
stretch to call the defacement of property, and perhaps even an inside 
trading tip, functional in this sense.  But the category does capture a 
significant amount of speech involving hard coverage questions, especially 
in cases of machine-generated speech. 
The functionality category applies to the specific speech practice rather 
than to speech in the abstract.  Computer code is a good example.  One of 
the foundational First Amendment decisions involving computer code is 
Junger v. Daley.226  The case involved a facial challenge to a regulation 
prohibiting the exportation of encryption computer code.227  The district 
court rejected the argument that the regulation violated the First 
Amendment by abridging speech embodied in computer code.228  It based 
this conclusion on the premise that “source code is by design functional” 
because “it is created . . . to do a specified task, not to communicate 
ideas.”229  The Sixth Circuit reversed, ruling that code is protected by the 
First Amendment because it “is an expressive means for the exchange of 
 
the categorical approach, see 1 SMOLLA, supra note 75, § 12:9, and Pierre J. Schlag, An 
Attack on Categorical Approaches to Freedom of Speech, 30 UCLA L. REV. 671 (1983). 
 223. Wu, supra note 24, at 1517 (“[C]ourts already maintain an informal exclusion based 
on functional considerations.”). 
 224. Id. at 1533. 
 225. See Samuel D. Warren & Louis Brandeis, The Right to Privacy, 4 HARV. L. REV. 193 
(1890). 
 226. 209 F.3d 481 (6th Cir. 2000). 
 227. Id. at 483–84. 
 228. Junger v. Daley, 8 F. Supp. 2d 708, 712 (N.D. Ohio 1998), rev’d, 209 F.3d at 481. 
 229. Id. at 717. 
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information and ideas about computer programming.”230  Finding that the 
functional capacity of code should not preclude constitutional protection, 
the court held that “the appropriate consideration of the medium’s 
functional capacity is in the analysis of permitted government 
regulation.”231 
The Sixth Circuit’s reasoning in Junger maps well on to the structure of a 
functionality principle.  Computer code in general is not an uncovered 
category of speech.  The specific social practices entangled with code vary 
greatly.  Some of these practices, such as installing or running software on a 
computer, are clearly functional and do not directly realize First 
Amendment values.232  Other code-related practices, such as publication in 
an academic journal or the internet publication of code as part of course 
materials at issue in Junger, clearly realize First Amendment values.  As 
explained by Robert Post, whether a particular regulation of code is covered 
depends on the speech practices it affects.233  To the extent the regulation is 
narrowly drafted to only capture functional code practices, it does not affect 
covered speech.234  By contrast, if the regulation captures nonfunctional 
speech practices, it affects covered speech and must be reviewed under the 
appropriate First Amendment standard, depending on whether its effect on 
such practices is content based or content neutral. 
Finally, even if the regulation is limited to functional speech practices, its 
incidental effect on other freedom of speech relevant social practices must 
be considered.  Thus, for example, if the regulation of encryption code 
negatively affects the ability of people to use computer technology in order 
to disseminate anonymous electronic speech (for example, through blogs or 
discussion groups), it will be subjected to First Amendment review.  The 
focus of this form of review, however, will be the incidentally affected 
speech practice, not the effect on the speech embodied in encryption 
code.235 
The closest the courts came to articulating a functionality category of 
noncovered speech was another code-related case:  Universal City Studios 
Inc. v. Corley.236  The defendant in the case—Corley—was enjoined from 
posting on his website and knowingly linking to decryption computer code 
known as DeCSS, used to bypass CSS (Content Scrambling System), the 
industry’s DVD access control measure.237  These actions were alleged to 
 
 230. Junger, 209 F.3d at 485. 
 231. Id. at 484. 
 232. See generally Pamela Samuelson et al., A Manifesto Concerning the Legal 
Protection of Computer Programs, 94 COLUM. L. REV. 2308, 2320 (1994) (describing 
software as “a machine whose medium of construction happens to be text”). 
 233. See Post, supra note 72, at 718–20. 
 234. In Junger, the government’s somewhat crude attempt to use this distinction failed 
because the limiting criterion of the regulation did not restrict its effect to functional 
practices.  Limiting the regulation to encryption code published in electronic form still 
included many nonfunctional practices such as an academic publication of code in an 
electronic journal. See id. at 720. 
 235. See supra text accompanying notes 75–77. 
 236. 273 F.3d 429 (2d Cir. 2001). 
 237. Id. at 437. 
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violate the Digital Millennium Copyright Act (DMCA) prohibition on 
trafficking in technology for the circumvention of technological measures 
controlling access to copyrighted works.238  Relying on Junger, Corley 
argued that the DMCA violated the First Amendment by restricting the 
dissemination of certain computer code.239  In analyzing this argument the 
Second Circuit, upholding the trial court, recognized the complex nature of 
computer code.  Following Junger, the court ruled that “[c]ommunication 
does not lose constitutional protection as ‘speech’ simply because it is 
expressed in the language of computer code,”240 and that computer code 
“can merit First Amendment protection.”241  Rather than concluding its 
analysis at this point, however, the court went on to consider the significant 
functional aspect of computer code and found that “[t]he functionality of 
computer code properly affects the scope of its First Amendment 
protection.”242  The court’s strategy for handling this duality of computer 
code inherent in the combination of functional and expressive aspects is 
typical of modern First Amendment jurisprudence.  The court treated the 
DMCA as a content-neutral regulation aimed at the functionality of 
circumvention code and affecting its expressive content only 
incidentally.243  Accordingly, the court analyzed the anticircumvention 
prohibition under the lenient review standard applied to content-neutral 
regulations, finding that enjoining Corley from posting and knowingly 
linking to DeCSS passes muster.244 
The Second Circuit’s decision in Universal City Studios correctly 
articulated and applied the functionality principle.  A finding that computer 
code is merely expressive, or that it constitutes speech, is insufficient to 
determine whether and how the First Amendment applies to a particular 
regulation of code.  The crucial element of the analysis is whether and how 
the regulation targets significant speech practices, as opposed to just the 
functional aspect of code.  Unfortunately, the court’s insistence on fitting its 
analysis of this question into the Procrustean bed of a content-neutral 
review standard is untenable.  The prerequisite for applying the content-
neutral, intermediate review standard is finding that the regulation does not 
target specific speech on the basis of its content.  The court was able to find 
that the DMCA was content neutral by artificially unbundling the 
expressive and functional aspects of computer code and concluding that the 
anticircumvention prohibition only targeted the latter.  The opinion conveys 
this argument through the metaphor of a skeleton key that happens to have 
some text emblazoned upon it.245  The anticircumvention regulation, the 
court explained, is content neutral “just as would be a restriction on 
trafficking in skeleton keys identified because of their capacity to unlock 
 
 238. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(2) (2012). 
 239. Universal City Studios, 273 F.3d at 436. 
 240. Id. at 445. 
 241. Id. at 449. 
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 243. Id. at 454. 
 244. Id. at 453–58. 
 245. Id. at 452–54. 
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jail cells, even though some of the keys happened to bear a slogan or other 
legend that qualified as a speech component.”246  The metaphor is 
misleading.  In the case of computer code, unlike the case of the text-
bearing key, the speech and the function are inexorably bundled together.247  
In order to carry out a function in a specific way, computer code must have 
specific expressive content.  The specific expressive content of code—the 
meaning understandable by humans who can read it—follows directly from 
the specific function it carries out.248  In short, with code the expressive 
content is the function and vice versa.  It follows that a regulation of code 
cannot target a specific function without directly targeting specific 
expression because of its content.  Unlike the regulation of skeleton keys, 
which affects the text on the keys only incidentally, targeting the function 
of computer code is targeting specific content of code.249 
Disentangling the effects of regulation of code on function and content 
cannot be done on the level of speech, as the Universal City Studios court’s 
content-neutrality analysis attempts.  But it can be done on the level of 
social speech practices.  A regulation cannot target a specific function of 
code without directly targeting a specific expressive content, but it can 
target a normatively irrelevant functional speech practice without targeting 
normatively relevant speech practices.  A prohibition on causing a computer 
to execute circumventing computer code, for example, targets specific 
speech on the basis of its content, but it does not target a social practice that 
directly realizes First Amendment values.  In such a case, the regulation 
affects only uncovered speech and does not trigger First Amendment 
review at all.  When the analysis is done on the appropriate level—that of 
 
 246. Id. at 454. 
 247. One can demonstrate how speech and function are inexorably bundled together 
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a particular function inevitably involves a particular expressive content.  Regulating a certain 
function inescapably means regulating a specific expressive content. 
 248. Samuelson et al., supra note 232, at 2316 (describing computer programs as 
“machines (entities that bring about useful results, i.e., behavior) that have been constructed 
in the medium of text (source and object code)”). 
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disproportionally affect particular content in a way that is incidental to targeting a particular 
function.  As explained, when it comes to code, the function and the expressive content are 
one and the same, and targeting the function is targeting specific content. 
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speech practices—its focus changes.  The doctrinal inquiry becomes 
coverage rather than the appropriate review standard. 
Stripped of its indefensible flee to the content-neutral intermediate 
review standard, Universal City Studios provides a template for a First 
Amendment functionality doctrine.  Faced with a First Amendment 
challenge to a regulation affecting speech that closely combines functional 
and expressive elements, a court should go through several stages of 
analysis. 
First, the court should examine the specific social speech practices 
affected by the regulation.  Any dominantly functional practice that only 
trivially realizes free speech values is not covered, and the effect of the 
regulation on it does not require First Amendment scrutiny.  A good 
example of uncovered suppression of speech in the context of the DMCA 
anticircumvention provisions is the prohibition on circumventing a 
technological measure controlling access to a copyrighted work (contrasted 
with the prohibition on trafficking in such technology).250  The speech 
practices targeted by this prohibition are purely functional.  They are geared 
toward achieving the utilitarian end of defeating a protection measure and 
achieving access and they do not directly implicate free speech values.251 
Alternatively, if an affected speech practice is found to directly realize 
free speech values, the First Amendment must be applied.  In cases such as 
those of computer code, where the functional and expressive aspects of the 
speech are closely entangled such that regulation of the function necessarily 
entails the regulation of content, the strict standard applied to content-based 
regulation must be used.  The case of Professor Edward Felten falls within 
this category.  Felten, a computer science researcher at Princeton 
University, intended to present an academic paper demonstrating how his 
team broke the digital music watermarking scheme developed by the 
industry consortium known as Secured Digital Music Initiative (SDMI).  He 
was soon faced with legal threats from the Recording Association of 
America accusing him of alleged trafficking in circumventing technology in 
violation of the DMCA.252  Felten’s First Amendment claim in the ensuing 
litigation, which was never decided on the merits, supplies a good example 
of covered regulation of functional speech.253  The social practice at issue—
 
 250. See 17 U.S.C. § 1201(a)(1)(A) (2012). 
 251. The speech potentially involved with circumventing a protection measure is not 
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 252. See YOCHAI BENKLER, THE WEALTH OF NETWORKS:  HOW SOCIAL PRODUCTION 
TRANSFORMS MARKETS AND FREEDOM 416 (2006); LAWRENCE LESSIG, FREE CULTURE:  HOW 
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the presentation of an academic paper in an academic forum—is within the 
heart of speech practices traditionally recognized as realizing free speech 
values.  Thus, despite the functional aspect of the speech (i.e., the fact that it 
embodied a method for defeating the music protection scheme) a 
functionality doctrine would not regard regulation of this speech as 
uncovered by the First Amendment.  Furthermore, notwithstanding the fact 
that the DMCA’s antitrafficking prohibition targets the functional aspect of 
the speech—its aim is to prevent the proliferation of circumvention 
capabilities—the applicable standard in this case is the strict standard 
applied to content-based regulation.  To prevent the proliferation of 
circumvention technology, the regulation must regulate academic 
presentations like that of Felten on the basis of their specific content.254 
Finally, even if a particular speech practice is determined to be 
functional, thereby freeing its regulation from First Amendment scrutiny, 
any instrumental effect of the regulation on other normatively relevant 
speech practices must be considered.  This is the case of the possible 
detrimental effect of restricting the dissemination of encryption code on 
anonymous speech.255  The equivalent argument in the DMCA context is 
that the statute’s strict regulation of access circumvention and of trafficking 
in circumventing technology may result in an overbroad restriction of 
speech, depriving many users of effective means of creating expression in 
the digital age even when no legitimate interest such as preventing 
copyright infringement is being served.256  According to this argument, 
overly aggressive restriction of circumventing technology may result in 
depriving many of access to valuable expressive materials in the public 
domain or under circumstances of fair use.257  Notwithstanding that courts 
gave this argument short shrift, any probable instrumental effect of this kind 
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must be analyzed under the proper First Amendment standard.258  But the 
focus of this stage of the analysis will be the effect of the regulation on the 
normatively significant speech practices that are instrumentally supported 
by circumventing technology, not the effect on circumventing technology 
as speech. 
B.  Search Ranking As Functional Speech 
How does the functionality framework apply to implied observations of 
relevance embodied in search ranking?  As previously explained, the speech 
practices of search engines are not connected in a meaningful way to the 
realization of First Amendment values.259  The functionality analysis leads 
to the flipside of this conclusion:  the speech practices of search ranking are 
not connected to free speech values because they are predominantly 
functional. 
Search ranking is functional speech because its overwhelmingly 
dominant purpose and character is serving an instrumental function:  
assisting users in locating and accessing content relevant to their specific 
preferences.  Uses of general-purpose internet search engines vary.  As 
mentioned above, some uses are navigational, in the sense that the user 
already knows what information or at least what venue she is trying to 
access and only uses the search engine as a directional tool (e.g., Jill 
searches “Macy’s sale” in an attempt to reach the Macy’s sale website).260  
Other searches are much more open ended and therefore include a stronger 
element of the search engine shaping users’ preference (e.g., Jack searches 
“affirmative action” hoping to educate himself on the subject).  Different 
search instances are located on different points of this spectrum.  Even in 
instances located closer to the open-ended pole of the search spectrum, 
however, search engines’ ranking operates as functional speech.  The 
communication search engines generate is merely an instrumentality in the 
process of helping users locate and access certain information. 
Search engines undoubtedly differ from completely passive conduits for 
transmitting information, such as cable services providers.  Rather than 
passively facilitating access by users to content on the basis of 
predetermined user preferences, search engines often take a more 
significant and active part in influencing and structuring the preferences of 
users.261  James Grimmelmann captured this role of search engines by 
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describing them as “advisors.”262  The metaphor aptly captures the active 
role of search engines in forming users’ preferences.  But it may also be 
misleading.  The term evokes the image of one who helps another shape her 
preferences through discursive practices:  reasoning, dialogue, debate, or 
exchange of opinions.  But it is the absence of this discursive element from 
the search process that makes it functional. This predominant functional 
operation of search ranking is exactly what any plausible regulation targets, 
whatever its underlying policy rationale.  The aim of any legislative 
measure or applicable common law doctrine is the instrumental effect of 
rankings:  the way they channel users to specific content by specific 
providers. 
One may object that the fact that a particular speech results in certain 
effects, and that such postulated effects motivate its regulation, does not 
make the regulated speech practice functional.  Many regulations of speech 
covered by the First Amendment are motivated by and target supposed 
harmful or undesirable effects of speech.  Advocates of regulating violent 
computer games, for example, often point to the claimed causal connection 
of exposure to such speech to violent behavior.263  The crucial difference is 
that in the case of functional speech practices, the connection between the 
speech and the targeted effect is not mediated through normatively 
significant speech practices.  In such cases, the speech operates merely as 
an instrumentality, a means for bringing about the relevant effect without 
implicating practices that realize free speech values.  This is the difference 
between excluding certain businesses from being listed in a Yellow Pages 
directory and publishing bad reviews of the services provided by those 
businesses.  Both instances may result in reducing the patronage of the 
businesses and both may shape customer preferences.  But it is only the 
latter that achieves the effect and shapes preferences through discursive 
practices that realize free speech values.  The speech embodied in search 
engine ranking is of the former kind.  It instrumentally facilitates a 
functional process of channeling users to websites, and thereby helps to 
shape users’ preferences, but does not do so as part of a social practice 
relevant for free speech values.  As a result, search engine ranking falls 
within the category of functional speech not covered by the First 
Amendment. 
CONCLUSION 
Initially, the claim that First Amendment protection extends to ranking of 
search results may appear well founded, at least as a matter of positive law.  
On closer examination, this certainty disappears.  The First Amendment has 
a vital role to play in limiting governmental power to use search engines as 
tools for suppressing the speech interests of information providers and 
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users.  Applied in this way, however, even vigilant protection of free speech 
rights allows much leeway for regulations of search engines that do not 
have clear censorial effects or motivations in regard to users or information 
providers.  The more ambitious arguments that claim constitutional 
protection for the speech interest of the search engine itself produce 
somewhat inconclusive results under existing doctrine.  As a normative 
matter these arguments fare much worse.  The relevant social practices of 
search engine speech lack any meaningful connection to any values 
underlying freedom of speech.  As a result, there is no justification for 
extending the strong protection of the First Amendment to these practices, 
speech in the technical sense though they may be. 
An important side effect of closely examining the arguments for search 
engine speech is bringing to the fore the long-recognized but oft-repressed 
question of First Amendment coverage.  The claim that any regulation of 
search results triggers the First Amendment simply because search rankings 
qualify under a broad, technical definition of speech raises with full force 
the question of coverage limitations.  The implications of rejecting any such 
limitations on the scope of the First Amendment could be momentous in 
terms of the constitutional restrictions laid on government’s ability to 
regulate in the information age.  This is not simply a matter of criticizing 
existing law.  Coverage is part and parcel of existing First Amendment 
jurisprudence, and yet it is an area of this law that is particularly obscure 
and unarticulated.  The development of a more explicit and elaborate 
functionality doctrine could clarify this aspect of the law, at least in regard 
to an important subset of the cases where activities that qualify as speech do 
not receive First Amendment protection. 
Perhaps most importantly, the search engine speech debate is a poignant 
reminder that the field of First Amendment law could use a healthy dose of 
some of the familiar lessons of legal realism.  One such lesson is the 
internal complexity of legal doctrine.  The mechanical application of 
abstract concepts, such as a general definition of speech, rarely decides 
concrete legal questions, especially ones involving new and challenging 
circumstances like the question of search engine speech.264  This 
complexity is a feature of existing legal doctrine that already contains 
nuances that prevent unproblematic derivation of clear outcomes in 
concrete cases from abstract general principles.265  Understood against this 
backdrop, conceptual abstractions that may seem determinative of the issue, 
such as the editorial search engine or the opinionated search engine, lose 
much of their appeal.  Whether the First Amendment protects search 
engines’ absolute control of their search ranking is a new and challenging 
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normative question.  It is a normative question, moreover, that cannot be 
answered solely by reference to such abstractions as what constitutes speech 
or who is an editor.  An adequate answer can only be provided in light of 
the concrete details of the social practices to which the legal rule is 
applied.266  This Article argues that such an examination of the normative 
significance of the social practices of search engine speech yields no reason 
to extend First Amendment protection to search rankings. 
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